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MODERNIZING THE LAW OF OPEN-AIR SPEECH:
THE HUGHES COURT AND THE BIRTH OF
CONTENT-NEUTRAL BALANCING
William E. Lee*
INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 2003, a massive crowd, perhaps as large as 400,000 people,'
gathered in the streets of New York City to protest the impending war with Iraq. 2
Protest organizers had requested a permit for a march in front of the United Nations
building, but city officials, concerned about security, refused to allow a parade. A
federal district court upheld the city's decision to limit the protest to a stationary
rally.4 Drawing upon Supreme Court precedents from the 1930s, the district court
declared that while citizens have a right to use streets for public assembly, the
* Professor, Grady College of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of
Georgia. ©William E. Lee, 2004.
' See Robert D. McFadden, Threats and Responses: Overview; From New York to
Melbourne, Cries for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 1, at I (noting that "[c]rowd
estimates are often little more than politically tinged guesses"; police estimated the crowd
to be 100,000, while organizers said 400,000 people attended), available at LEXIS, News
Library, NY Times file. In Washington, D.C., a frequent site of large protests, "the United
States Park Police stopped providing counts for rallies after bitter disputes over past
estimates." Robin Toner, Abortion Rights Marchers Vow to Fight Another Bush Term, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, NY Times file.
2 Anti-war protests also occurred in many other American cities and towns on February
15, 2003. See Jodi Wilgoren, Threats and Responses: Domestic Dissent; In Word, Song and
Sign, Demonstrators Across the United States Say No to an Invasion of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2003, § 1, at 21, available at LEXIS, News Library, NY Times file. During the war,
street protests occurred in major cities. See, e.g., Joe Garofoli, et al., Protests: Tens of
Thousands Demonstrate Peacefully in S.F., 200,000 Take to Streets in N.Y., S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 23, 2003, at Wi, available at 2003 WL 8245377; Ana Mendieta & Kate N. Grossman,
Local Anti- War Protests Attract Thousands, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, News Special
Edition, at 11, available at 2003 WL 6839400. On August 29, 2004, an anti-war march in
New York City drew an estimated crowd of 500,000. Robert D. McFadden, Vast Anti-Bush
Rally Greets Republicans in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at Al, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NY Times file.
3 United for Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20-21
(S.D.N.Y.), afffd, 323 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003).
4 Id. at 31.
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government may also regulate public expression to protect safety and similar
content-neutral interests.5
A century ago, however, there was a different constitutional order concerning
open-air speech. Under Davis v. Massachusetts,6 municipal officials had the au-
thority to ban rallies on public property. Some officials also believed they had the
authority to allow public property to be used only by those speakers with favored
viewpoints. From the late 1800s until the late 1930s, Davis and "the atmosphere
which it generated"7 influenced a variety of police power ordinances sharply re-
stricting certain forms of public expression in American cities.8
5 Id. at 23.
6 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
7 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 286 n.2 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Prior to the Davis decision, a handful of state courts had ruled in the 1880s and 1890s that
local governments had only limited power and accompanying text. But the Davis opinion
largely halted, until the late 1930s, judicial sympathy for the idea that public property is
appropriately used for expressive purposes.
Despitejudicial hostility to their free speech claims, groups such as the Socialists and the
Industrial Workers of the World ("Wobblies"), fought for the right to speak in public during the
early decades of the twentieth century. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A
HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD (Joseph A. McCartin ed., abr. ed.
2000); FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS: I.W.W. FREE SPEECH FIGHTS AS TOLD BY
PARTICIPANTS (Philip S. Foner ed., 1981) [hereinafter FELLOW WORKERS]; THEODORE
SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS (1916); David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech
Fights and Popular Conceptions of Free Expression Before World War 1, 80 VA. L. REV.
1055 (1994) (arguing that groups, such as the IWW, advanced free speech ideals largely out-
side of the legal system); JohnW. Wertheimer, Free Speech Fights: The Roots ofModern Free-
Expression Litigation in the United States (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University) (on file with author). Although the Socialists were not successful in changing the
legal doctrine concerning open-air speech, their efforts did changethe way in which Americans
thought about open-air speaking. In the late nineteenth century, few litigants or judges
thought open-air speech restrictions raised free speech issues. Id. at 215. "In contrast, by the
second decade of the twentieth century, largely as a result of the efforts of Socialist litigants
and polemicists, the control of open-air speaking was unmistakably a free-speech issue." Id.
For discussions of freedom of expression during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, see, for example, MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE
AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling in
the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RECONSIDERED 14 (Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J. Brown eds., 1982); David M. Rabban,
The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American
History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47 (1992); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its
Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1980) [hereinafter Rabban, Forgotten Years].
8 See, e.g., Thomas v. Casey, 1 A.2d 866, 869 (N.J. 1938) (stating that under Davis,
liberty of speech did not include the right to speak on public property without a permit);
Coughlin v. Chi. Park Dist., 4 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 1936) (same).
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In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Court turned away from Davis and crafted
several crucial doctrines concerning open-air speech. In an earlier article, I summar-
ized these interrelated doctrines as follows: "First, licensing standards allowing
unduly discretionary judgments by government officials are unconstitutional.
Second, certain public properties are appropriate places for expression. Finally, the
government may protect public safety and similar interests through narrowly drawn,
content-neutral regulations."9 These doctrines remain key facets of the current
Court's free expression methodology. For example, Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society, Inc. v. Village ofStratton,'0 decided in 2002, was largely decided within the
"historical and analytical backdrop" created by cases from the late 1930s and early
1940s. " As Justice Kennedy reminded the Court in 2000, "the whole course of our
free speech jurisprudence, sustaining the idea of open public discourse which is the
hallmark of the American constitutional system, rests to a significant extent on cases
involving picketing and leafleting."' 2
The abandonment of Davis is part of a larger story concerning the Supreme
Court's discovery of the First Amendment, a process that began in 1919 with the
famous dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, 3 gained momentum in the early
1930s with cases such as Near v. Minnesota4 and Stromberg v. California,I" and
escalated with a series of cases articulating the preferred position doctrine in the late
1930s and early 1940s. 6 Familiar elements of that story include the renunciation
9 William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The
Doctrine of Time, Place and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
757, 761-62 (1986) [hereinafter Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers] (footnotes omitted).
10 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
n Id. at 161.
12 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'" Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466,482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally David M.
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205
(1983) [hereinafter Rabban, Emergence] (discussing the dissents of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis in the Espionage Act cases).
14 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (finding a state statute restricting certain types of publishing an
unconstitutional prior restraint).
15 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (holding that a state statute unconstitutionally punished the
display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to the government).
16 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("The right of freedom
of speech and press has broad scope... [and] may not be withdrawn even if it creates the
minor nuisance for a community."); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940)
(stating that "[m]ere legislative preferences" may support regulations aimed at other
activities, but are insufficient to justify restrictions on free expression); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (holding the same). See generally David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil Rights and Liberties, 1930-1941, 1987 DUKE L.J.
800; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Preferred-Position
Debate, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 39 (1987).
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of Lochner-era freedom of contract, the elevation of First Amendment freedoms as
preferred rights, and the development of bifurcated judicial review. 7
The traditional accounts of the Supreme Court's discovery of the First
Amendment emphasize the contributions of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and
Louis Brandeis, Judge Learned Hand, and Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr."s These
seminal figures were focused on the government's treatment of anti-government
speech, a critical content regulation problem. 9 Of these individuals, only Holmes
had a significant part to play in the development of content-neutral doctrine.
Holmes's role, however, was negative. The doctrinal developments in the 1930s
were contrary to Holmes's views about the power of local governments to restrict
open-air speech. In 1895, while a member of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, Holmes wrote the following: "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally
to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of
the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid
it in his house."2 Nothing in this statement presaged Holmes's First Amendment
epiphany of 1919,21 nor his status in the 1920s and 1930s as a First Amendment
17 See, e.g., G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of
Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996); David Yassky,
Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 1699 (1991).
" See Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's "First
Freedom," 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 557, 560-61 (1999) (describing the
traditional literature).
'9 Chafee played a minor part in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U.S. 496 (1939). See infra Part II.B. As a member of the Bill of Rights Committee of the
American Bar Association, Chafee collaborated with Grenville Clark on an amicus brief.
DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 196 (1986).
However, "Chafee credited Clark with doing 'the lion's share' of the work on the brief." Id.
The late Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. claimed the Hague Court was "aided, and obviously
made use of a major amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the
American Bar Association." Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14. However, the central points of the amicus brief
resembled those made by the respondents.
Chafee's seminal book dealt primarily with content-based problems; public assembly
and similar forms of open-air speech were addressed solely in the context of limits on radical
speech. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). Chafee's later work included
a discussion of the Supreme Court's content-neutral doctrines developed during the late
1930s and early 1940s. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
398-438 (1941) [hereinafter CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH].
20 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). But
see ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 151
(1904) (claiming that the power of the legislature to control the streets is not equivalent to
that of a private property owner).
21 See, e.g., Rabban, Emergence, supra note 13. But see Sheldon M. Novick, The
Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 303 (claiming that
Holmes did not change his views on the clear and present danger test in 1919); Fred D.
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icon. 22 As the Hughes Court in the 1930s began building content-neutral doctrines
concerning public speech, it had to bury Holmes's nineteenth century views, a rather
awkward process given Holmes's stature.
One of the pivotal steps taken by the Hughes Court was to regard speech
freedom and press freedom as equally important. Since the 1930s, the modem
Supreme Court has frequently referred to "freedom of expression,"23 a phrase that
does not appear in the First Amendment and was unknown to the Framers.24 The
Court also began using the terms "speech" and "press" interchangeably. 25 Phrases
Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present
Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919,58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971). See generally
G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 412-54
(1993) (discussing Holmes's free speech views).
22 As the petitioners in Hague stated, "the liberality" of Justice Holmes's views "cannot
be questioned." Brief on Behalf of Petitioners at 34, Hague, 307 U.S. 496 (No. 651).
Professor Chafee regarded Holmes as a free speech champion equivalent to John Milton,
Thomas Erskine, and John Smart Mill. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 509. Justice
Frankfurter wrote, "[n]o Justice thought more deeply about the nature of a free society or was
more zealous to safeguard its conditions by the most abundant regard for civil liberty than
Mr. Justice Holmes." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 351 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
23 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269 (1964) (stating that "freedom
of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment"). The case
involved defamation suits brought against the New York Times and a group of ministers;
the "actual malice" standard developed in the case applied equally to the newspaper and
the ministers. Id.
The phrase "freedom of expression" made its first appearance in a majority opinion in
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). The Court noted that the clear and present danger
test "has afforded practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of
constitutional protections of freedom of expression was in issue." Id. at 262. The related
phrase"liberty of expression" had appeared in earlier opinions. See, e.g., Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.");
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) ("[L]iberty of expression 'is not
absolute....').
24 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455,
488 (1983) (stating that "the notion of an interrelated complex of protections for thought,
belief, and expression is a modem concept").
25 For a contemporary example, see Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 636 (1994) ("Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech,
and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First
Amendment."). Sometimes the Court uses the singular to describe freedom of speech and
press. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). In Martin, Justice Black
wrote: "The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First
Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but
they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment
was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance." Id. at 143.
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such as "freedom of expression" and the exchangeability of the terms "speech" and
"press" reflect the Court's belief that street corner speakers do not have less First
Amendment protection than journalists.
Modem constitutional interpretation masks the distinct origins27 and histories
of press freedom and open-air speech freedom. Throughout the nineteenth century,
it was commonly understood that press freedom prohibited prior restraints on
publishing, while allowing subsequent punishments.28 Open-air speakers, however,
26 The Supreme Court has rejected every claim that members of the press have rights
greater than other citizens. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (holding
that the press is not exempt from search warrants); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(stating that journalists must comply with grand jury subpoenas). But see Potter Stewart, "Or
of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (claiming that "the Free Press Clause
extends protection to an institution"). Justice Stewart's claim spawned an extensive body
of literature. See, e.g., Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First
Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 225 (arguing that the best way to protect the First
Amendment rights of the press is to expand the First Amendment rights of individuals).
27 See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (1960) (stating that freedom of speech "developed
as an offshoot of freedom of the press... [and] freedom of religion"); Anderson, supra note
24, at 488 (noting that the Press Clause had its own origins, separate from the other First
Amendment rights).
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson are the only members of the Court to question the
relevance of press cases in open-air speech cases. Justice Jackson said that precedents from
the field of press freedom "cannot reasonably be transposed to the street-meeting field
[because tihe impact of publishing on public order has no similarity with that of a street
meeting." Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter claimed that press freedom cases, such as Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931), "are rooted in historic experience regarding prior restraints on publication. They give
recognition to the role of the press in a democracy," a consideration not pertinent in open-
air cases involving religious speech. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
28 See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 526
(4th ed. 1878) (stating that the "liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used
it was to be responsible in case of its abuse"). Joseph Story's influential nineteenth century
commentary on the Constitution referred to the First Amendment as meaning "that every
man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever,
without any prior restraint, so always, that he does not injure any other person in his rights,
person, property, or reputation." 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTTrUTION
OFTHE UNITED STATES 667-68 (Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2001) (1833). Story's reference to a
right to speak free of prior restraint needs to be read in context. Speech had never been
licensed in England or the American colonies. As Professor Levy notes, "[w]hen the press
was freed from prior restraints it simply became directly amenable to the law of libel as
speech had always been. Thus, freedom of speech and freedom of the press, being subject
to the same restraints of subsequent punishment, were rarely distinguished." LEVY, supra
note 27, at 174.
While modem scholars agree that the Press Clause was intended to eliminate prior
1224
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faced a different legal culture. With increased urbanization in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, municipalities began requiring licenses for public speeches and
assemblies; these licensing schemes were not regarded as violating constitutional
speech rights.29 And, municipal governments treated newspapers differently from
other types of printed material such as leaflets and advertising circulars. The
distribution of leaflets was often banned, licensed, or closely regulated, requirements
generally not applied to newspapers.3"
This Article explores the birth of content-neutral doctrines such as a First
Amendment right to use public property for expressive purposes, and the accom-
panying power of the government to regulate open-air speech.3 As the Hughes
restraints, they disagree as to whether the Framers intended to abolish seditious libel prosecu-
tions. Compare Anderson, supra note 24 (arguing that the Press Clause had a broad
meaning), with Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 177 (1984) (arguing that the Framers had a narrow definition of press freedom). See
also William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984) (claiming that an intent to abolish seditious libel is found in
the Constitution's structure of federalism and limited powers); David M. Rabban, The
Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,
37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985) (reviewing LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
(1985)).
29 Wertheimer, supra note 7, at 131 (during the first century of the nation's existence,
neither litigants nor courts considered outdoor speaking to be protected by constitutional
speech clauses). Because of this legal culture, groups, such as the Salvation Army,
challenging nineteenth century restrictions on public speech commonly invoked religious
liberty rather than freedom of speech. The Davis case was the first open-air case to present
freedom of speech claims. See infra Part I.B.
3 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Brabender, 51 A. 374 (Pa. 1902) (holding that an
ordinance regulating handbills and circulars as "nuisances," yet excepting newspapers, is
reasonable); Wettengel v. City of Denver, 39 P. 343 (Colo. 1895) (holding that an ordinance
prohibiting handbill distribution, yet allowing newspaper distribution, is a reasonable means
of preventing littering). Municipal ordinances prohibiting or regulating distribution of
handbills, while exempting newspapers, were also commonplace in the early part of the
twentieth century. See, e.g., People v. St. John, 288 P. 53 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1930)
(noting that there is ample judicial authority supporting the enactment of reasonable
regulations regulating or prohibiting the distribution of handbills and circulars).
31 This Article focuses on doctrine developed during the latter part of Chief Justice
Hughes's tenure. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), decided during the first year
of Chief Justice Stone's tenure, is discussed because it is a clarification of a key Hughes-era
case, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Six Justices voting in Chrestensen also voted
in Schneider. See infra note 209.
This Article also emphasizes cases involving open-air speech activities occurring on
public property. Nonetheless, the Court, during the early 1940s, addressed several cases
involving speech on private property. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (finding unconstitutional a municipal ban on door-to-door solicitation of literature);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting
labor picketing). Professor Post claims that the Court's cases during the late 1930s and early
1225
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Court created the modem doctrine of open-air speech, it introduced balancing into
First Amendment methodology. The Court announced it would "weigh the circum-
stances and... appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of [a]
regulation of [open-air speech]."32 Yet, to add a point of nuance, this balancing was
not always weighted in favor of open-air speech. In cases involving minimal
burdens on speech, the Court continued to defer to the judgment of local officials.
Additionally, as the Court denounced the arbitrary licensing of religious, political,
and labor speech, it allowed municipal officials to make arbitrary decisions about
commercial speech.
Part I of this Article explains Davis and the licensing of open-air speech. Part
I reveals how the Hughes Court dismantled Davis, at least for noncommercial
speech. Finally, Part HI explains the development of the concept of "ordered
freedom."
I. LICENSING OPEN-AIR SPEECH
The right of free speech, as I understand it, consists of two
main branches - the freedom of the press, and the freedom of
the platform or the right of assemblage. The former of these was
won generations ago by our ancestors after centuries of agitation
and struggle; the latter came later in time, has had to be
contested step by step, and even yet, though embodied in our
law, is not completely part of the bone and sinew of American
democracy.
-Professor J.Q. Dealey, 1914 13
In the 1880s, the Salvation Army swept through American cities; Salvationists
believed they were following God's command in aggressive street proselytizing of
those who did not attend church.34 Salvation Army parades, featuring singing and
musical instruments such as tambourines and trumpets, were often the targets of
1940s protect speech, regardless of its geographical location. See Robert C. Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 1713, 1720-21 (1987).
32 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
" J.Q. Dealey, Discussion, 9 AM. SOC. SOC'Y 42 (1914). Justice Holmes also referred
to free speech as a broad concept encompassing press freedom. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democrat Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (revocation of a newspaper's second-class mailing privileges is harmful
because "the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our
tongues").
' See Rachel Vorspan, "Freedom of Assembly" and the Right to Passage in Modern
English Legal History, 34 SAN DINGO L. REv. 921, 943-44 (1997).
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newly-enacted parade licensing ordinances.35 Salvationists, though, regarded licen-
sing requirements for parades and assemblies as an interference with their religious
liberty.3 6 From 1886 to 1893, in a series of cases involving the Salvationists, the
supreme courts of Michigan, Kansas, Illinois, and Wisconsin ruled that the
regulation of parades must be impartial. 37 The decisions of the Michigan, Kansas,
and Illinois courts relied primarily upon municipal powers analysis.38 The notion
of rights, such as the pursuit of happiness,39 played only a very minor part in the
judicial analysis of these cases.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, was the first court to bring the Federal
Constitution into play in a case involving the state regulation of parading. Although
framed in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the
Wisconsin court's decision in In re Garrabad° is a significant precursor of the First
Amendment doctrine that the government "must afford all points of view an equal
3 See id. at 950-62.
36 See, e.g., In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72 (Mich. 1886).
31 See In re Garrabad, 54 N.W. 1104, 1107 (Wis. 1893) (stating that an arbitrary parade-
licensing ordinance is "un-American"); City of Chicago v. Trotter, 26 N.E. 359, 360 (Ill.
1891) (stating that arbitrary authority "is subversive of the liberty of the citizen"); Anderson
v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719, 723 (Kan. 1888) (stating that parade licensing ordinances
must not "allow an officer to prevent those with whom he did not agree on controverted
questions from calling public attention to the principles of their party"); Frazee, 30 N.W. at
76 (stating that arbitrary licensing "would enable a mayor or councilman to shut off
processions of those whose notions did not suit their views or tastes, in politics or religion,
or any other matter on which men differ").
Members of the Salvation Army were not always successful in court. See, e.g.,
Mashburn v. City of Bloomington, 32 111. App. 245 (I11. App. Ct. 1889) (declining to overturn
judgment against a defendant for violating a municipal ordinance).
" See Richard T. Pfohl, Note, Hague v. CIO and the Roots of Public Forum
Doctrine: Translating Limits of Powers into Individual Rights, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 533 (1993).
Municipal corporation law was simply an application of limits
of powers doctrine. At issue was not whether the individual had a
right to speak, but rather whether local municipalities had the
legitimate power - either as an explicit grant from the state or as
implied power of government - to regulate the conduct involved.
Id. at 543. Municipal ordinances were also required to be "reasonable" and arbitrary power
was considered to be unreasonable. Id. at 543, 544 n.58. See also FREUND, supra note 20,
at 57-61 (discussing the principle of reasonableness).
39 Trotter, 26 N.E. at 359 ("Citizens have the constitutional right 'of pursuing their own
happiness,"' including peacefully gathering in parades.); Anderson, 19 P. at 722 (stating that
the right of people to demonstrate is "too firmly established" to be questioned); Frazee, 30
N.W. at 75 (stating that "[iut has been customary, from time immemorial," for people to
gather together for parades).
40 54 N.W. 1104 (Wis. 1893).
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opportunity to be heard."4' Garrabad's progressive interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment would shape some of the key arguments presented to the United States
Supreme Court in Davis.
A. Garrabad
By the early 1890's, the city of Portage, Wisconsin had enacted a parade ordi-
nance directly aimed at the Salvation Army. Parades involving "shouting, singing,
or beating drums or tambourines, or playing upon any other musical instrument"
were prohibited unless the mayor issued a permit.42 Specifically exempted from the
ordinance were funeral processions, fire companies, the state militia, and political
parties. 3 In Garrabad, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the right to parade
"with music, banners, songs, and shouting, is a well-established right" that was
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause." The special
treatment of political parties was especially troublesome to the Wisconsin court:
An ordinance which expressly secures to political parties having
state organizations the absolute right to street parades and pro-
cessions, with all their usual accompaniments, and denies it to
the societies and other like organizations already mentioned,
except by permission of the mayor, who may arbitrarily refuse
it, is not valid, and offends against all well-established ideas of
civil and religious liberty. The people do not hold rights as im-
portant and well settled as the right to assemble and have public
parades and processions with music and banners and shouting
4, Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,96 (1972). The key passage from Mosley
is the following:
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views
it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which
issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an
"equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford
all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is
opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may
not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say.
Id. As Professor Kenneth Karst observed, the concept of equal liberty developed in Mosley
and similar cases "is not just a peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but rather
part of the 'central meaning of the First Amendment."' Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 21 (1975).
42 Garrabad, 54 N.W. at 1105.
43 id.
44 Id. at 1106.
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and songs, in support of any laudable or lawful cause, subject to
the power of any public officer to interdict or prevent them.a"
Drawing upon Yick Wo v. Hopkins,46 the Wisconsin court said the parade ordinance
was not "dictated by a fair and equal mind," but was an instrument of "petty
tyranny, the result of prejudice, bigotry, and intolerance .... It is entirely un-
American, and in conflict with the principles of our institutions and all modem ideas
of civil liberty."'47 To be valid, such an ordinance must have an equal and uniform
application and not be susceptible of "unjust and illegal discriminations."48
Garrabad rests upon the principle that the use of the streets for expressive
purposes must not depend upon the discretion of public officials. Davis, however,
presents an entirely different view: government officials have the "greater" authority
to decide whether or not public property is available for open-air speech and the
"lesser" authority to employ a licensing system.49
B. Davis
Neither the Czar of Russia, nor the Sultan of Turkey, can
exercise a more arbitrary and despotic power than by this
ordinance is conferred on the mayor of Boston.
-James F. Pickering, attorney for William F. Davis5"
Until 1862, Bostonians could freely speak on public property, such as the
Boston Common. During the Civil War, Boston officials in 1862 enacted an
ordinance requiring permission from local officials for "sermon[s], lecture[s],
address[es] or discourse[s] on the common or other public grounds" of the city."x
Opponents claimed the law was adopted "at the bidding of the rumsellers of Boston"
and was designed to silence those who spoke out against "the reeking abominations
of the Boston liquor traffic. 512
41 Id. at 1108.
46 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a laundry licensing ordinance, applied in a racially
discriminatory manner, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
47 Garrabad, 54 N.W. at 1107.
48 Id. Commenting on the principle of equality as applied to open-air speech, Professor
Freund wrote that "an uncontrolled power to grant or withhold privileges which might be
accorded on equal terms, is open to the greatest abuses." FREtND, supra note 20, at 671.
491 See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
50 Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 8, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229).
l Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 N.E. 577, 578 (Mass. 1886), affid, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
52 WIiAM F. DAVIS, CHRISTIAN LIBERTIES IN BOSTON: A SKETCH OF RECENT ATTEMPTS
To DESTROY THEM THROUGH THE DEVICE OF A GAG-BY-LAW FOR GOSPEL PREACHERS 9-10
(1887).
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In the early 1890s, the ordinance was changed in two significant ways. First,
the mayor became the sole official with authority to issue permits.5 3 Second, in
addition to public addresses, the ordinance required permits for the discharge of
cannons or firearms, the sale of "goods, wares, or merchandise," and the erection
of booths or tents for purposes of public amusement.54 The ordinance did not
specify the standards for licensing decisions.
"Brother" William F. Davis, a tenacious street preacher and litigant, was
frequently fined in the 1880s for violating the Boston permit ordinance.5 Davis
believed his right to preach was a gift "of nature and of God, which Government did
not give and cannot take away."56 His challenge to an 1885 conviction for violating
the ordinance raised technical arguments as well as protection under the freedom of
religion clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. 7 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in 1886 tersely rebuffed the technical claims.5 8  Although the
Massachusetts Constitution had long been interpreted as protecting the press from
licensing,59 the Supreme Judicial Court overlooked Davis's religious freedom claim
altogether.'
Davis continued to violate the Boston ordinance; even time in jail did not
deter him.6 On Sunday, June 10, 1894, Davis preached to a crowd on the Boston
" Davis, 167 U.S. at 44.
54 Id.
" See generally Wertheimer, supra note 7, at 161-75. Davis used the title "Brother"because "it best expressed his feelings toward all whom he met." SILAs P. COOK, ONE WHo
SERVED 27 (1918). Cook, a Harvard classmate of Davis, described Davis's motto as "go
preach." Id. at 26.
56 Plaintiff's Brief at 4, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229).
17 The briefs in the case are reprinted in DAVIS, supra note 52, at app. 12-58.
58 Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 N.E. 577 (Mass. 1886).
59 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304 (1825):
Besides, it is well understood, and received as a commentary on this
provision for the liberty of the press, that it was intended to prevent all
such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by
other governments, and in early times here, to stifle the efforts of
patriots towards enlightening their fellow subjects upon their rights and
the duties of rulers.
Id. at 313-14.
6 This decision prompted Davis to write, "[i]f Christian citizens hereafter have any
respect for this State Attorney and these Supreme Court judges, it will assuredly be in spite
of their deliverances in this case, and not because of them." DAVIS, supra note 52, at 71.
61 While in jail in 1887, Davis wrote an attack on the Boston "gag" law. DAVIS, supra
note 52. He offered a series of reasons explaining why he did not apply for a license, such
as the following: "Because Mayor O'Brien is not my God; and is in no wise competent to
authorize any man to do the work of a Christian Evangelist. The assumption that MayorO'Brien has any such authority as this ordinance implies, is profane as to the verge of
blasphemy." Id. at 13.
1230
MODERNIZING THE LAW OF OPEN-AIR SPEECH
Common. While "there was no disorder or disturbance," police arrested Davis for
speaking without a license.62 He appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.63 In this challenge, Davis claimed the Massachusetts Bill
of Rights protected free speech, assembly, and religious freedom.64 And, most
significantly, drawing upon Yick Wo and Garrabad, he argued the mayor's
discretion violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.65
Holmes, who had participated in the Massachusetts court's curt 1886 decision
finding an earlier version of the ordinance to be constitutional, bluntly wrote that the
constitutionality of the ordinance was "implied" by the earlier decision.66 Although
Davis had expanded his claims to include freedom of speech, Holmes readily
dismissed this argument; the law was not directed at free speech.67 Rather, it was
"directed towards the modes in which Boston Common may be used. '6' Holmes
then explained the state's power over public property:
As a representative of the public, [the Legislature] may and
does exercise control over the use to which the public may make
of such places, and it may and does delegate more or less of such
control to the city or town immediately concerned. For the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking
in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the
rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary rights
interfere, the Legislature may end the right of the public to enter
upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to
public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting the public
use to certain purposes.69
In short, because Boston could ban public entry into the Common, the "lesser step"
of controlling certain uses through licensing was also permissible. This resembled
62 Transcript of Record at 6, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229). John W. Little, the arresting
officer, testified that the grass in the area where Davis was speaking had been entirely worn
away because of its frequent use "by sundry persons who had been in the habit of preaching
at this place under a permit from the mayor." Id.
63 See Davis, 39 N.E. 113.
4 Transcript of Record at 8, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229).
65 Id.
6 Davis, 39 N.E. at 113.
67 Id.
68 id.
69 Id. For criticism of Holmes's treatment of nineteenth-century municipal corporation
law, see Pfohl, supra note 38, at 548 n.75.
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Holmes's 1892 opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,70 where he reasoned
that since citizens have no right to government employment, the state could restrict
the speech of its employees.7
Davis also argued the absence of standards in the Boston ordinance enabled the
mayor to censor preachers." Holmes readily dismissed this claim, writing "we
have no reason to believe, and do not believe, that this ordinance was passed for
any other than its ostensible purpose, namely, as a proper regulation of the use of
public grounds."73
James F. Pickering, the attorney for Davis, expanded his arguments in a sixty-
seven-page brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court.74 First, "Free
preaching" of the Gospel was a natural right that preceded creation of the state; the
Massachusetts Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment protected Davis from
being robbed of "his highest civil rights."75 Second, "free preaching" was customary
on the Boston Common until the ordinance of 1862.6 The city, as trustee, was
obligated to hold open the Common for its customary uses.77 Third, appealing to
that era's preference for property and economic liberties, Pickering claimed that
Davis's rights were no less important than "the rights of business men, and the
owners of property."' 8 Similarly, drawing upon Yick Wo, Pickering wrote, "a
preacher of the gospel, in Boston, is not less entitled to immunity from arbitrary
encroachments on his rights, than an unnaturalized Chinese laundryman in San
Francisco."79 Finally, the danger of censorship, noted in cases such as Garrabad,
was especially apparent in the Boston ordinance where the mayor had "wholly
70 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
"' Id. at 517 ('The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman."). Professor Van Alstyne's comment about
Holmes's Davis opinion is apt: Davis "may have a constitutional right to talk religion, but
he has no constitutional right to use the Boston Common." William W. Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439,
1440 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 19 N.E. 224, 226 (Mass. 1889) (noting
that rules governing street musicians "do not restrict any one in the ordinary use of his own
property, but merely affect the use which may be made of the streets and public places of the
city").
71 Davis, 39 N.E. at 113.
73 id.
74 Brief of Plaintiff in Error, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229).
71 Id. at 67; see also id. at 4, 20. It is important to note that while Pickering drew
extensively upon the Massachusetts Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, he
scarcely mentioned the First Amendment. See id. at 3-4; Transcript of Record at 8, Davis,
167 U.S. 43 (No. 229) (Defendant's Motion to Quash Complaint).
76 Plaintiff's Brief at 35, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229).
7 Id. at 30. Crowds as large as 20,000 people had gathered to hear open-air preaching on
the Common in the 1700s. Id. at 32.
71 Id. at 10.
" Id. at 50.
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personal, arbitrary and autocratic" authority.80 While others had given speeches on
the Common without a license, only preachers had been prosecuted for doing so.
81
To the Commonwealth, freedom of speech was "freedom as to substance, rather
than as to place," and Boston had not prevented Davis from preaching elsewhere."2
Nothing in the record showed the ordinance was unjustly administered; 3 in fact,
Davis had not been denied a permit.8' Just as Boston had the police power to license
peddlers, junk dealers, and pawnbrokers, it could also license preaching on the
Common. 5 Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause merely
meant that all citizens were subject to the same regulations.8 6 "Nothing [was] denied
to the plaintiff in error by the ordinance in question that is not denied to every
citizen of the United States." T
80 id. at 2. For a discussion of Garrabad, see id. at 59-60. See also id. at 55-58
(discussing other Salvation Army cases).
81 Id. at 17.
82 Brief of Defendant in Error at 10, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229). Similarly, freedom
of religion did not mean that one could occupy Boston Common for religious purposes.
Id. at 11.
83 Id. at 13.
' Id. at 11. In 1884, though, Davis had been denied a license. DAVIS, supra note 52, at
35. Other open-air preachers had also been denied licenses. H. L. Hastings reported that
Boston officials frequently refused to issue licenses or delayed the issuance of licenses in the
1880s. He wrote:
After having been arrested and fined for speaking without a
permit, and having been told by the judge on the bench that it was a
very simple thing to get a permit, I made a written application for a
permit. My application was treated with silent contempt. I afterwards
applied again, and through the kindness of his Honor the Mayor I
received a permit, but not untilfourteen months had elapsed since my
first application, during which time I had been fined and imprisoned for
preaching and reading the Bible. Nor am I at all certain that I should
have received the permit even at that date, had not a large and
influential body of ministers, by special vote, sent a request to the
mayor to grant me that permit. If it were so difficult for me to obtain a
permit, after preaching in this and other countries for nearly forty years,
during more than a score of which I have also edited a paper in Boston,
what would be the probability that an ordinary plain man would get a
permit to speak in public places? The fact is, the city government of
Boston has determined to suppress outdoor preaching.
H.L. Hastings, A Few Cold Facts Concerning Preaching on Boston Common, MONTHLY
MESSAGE, Apr. 1888, at 8. Apparently, licenses were commonly granted in the 1890s. See
supra note 62.
85 Defendant's Brief at 12, Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (No. 229).
86 Id. at 14.
87 Id.
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The Court was unwilling to extend the Fourteenth Amendment to open-air
preaching.8 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White observed that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not destroy the police power of states, nor did it create a
right of citizens to use public property "in defiance of the constitution and laws of the
State."89 Also, closely following Holmes's opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, inasmuch as Boston had the power to exclude public speakers from
the Common, it also had the "lesser" power to employ a permit system. 90
From a modem perspective, the Davis Court's lack of attention to the free
speech issues seems strange.9 But the case needs to be read in context. Davis was
decided in the era when the Court routinely held that ordinances conferring
discretionary power to municipal licensing boards, not just those regulating speech,
were permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment.92 These cases rested on a
presumption that the licensing power would be exercised in a proper manner.93 In
theory, if there were proof of arbitrary enforcement, courts could intervene.94
88 Davis, 167 U.S. 43.
89 Id. at 48.
9 Id.
"' Rabban, Forgotten Years, supra note 7, at 529 (citing Davis as an example of a case
in which "the Supreme Court did not even discuss free speech issues that the modem judge
would clearly identify"). Wertheimer notes that Davis "was among the first appellate cases
in American legal history in which judges were asked to decide whether or not an open-air
ordinance" interfered with freedom of speech. Wertheimer, supra note 7, at 175. "The 'free
speech issues' that the Gilded Age judges did not discuss, in other words, might be almost
as 'modem' as the 'modem judges' who would 'clearly identify' them today." Id.
92 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van de Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562 (1905)
(upholding an ordinance licensing the sale of milk even though the ordinance contains no
standards to guide licensing officials); see also Fischer v. City of St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361,
372 (1904) (noting that there are cases such as In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72 (Mich. 1886), and
City of Chicago v. Trotter, 26 N.E. 359 (Ill. 1891), holding that discretionary licensing
authority is "contrary to the spirit of American institutions," but the "great weight of
authority" authorizes delegation of power to licensing boards).
9" Van de Carr, 199 U.S. at 562; see also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 554
(1917) (according the commissioner a presumption that licensing authority will be executed
in the public interest, not "wantonly or arbitrarily"); Fischer, 194 U.S. at 37 (stating that the
Court is "bound to assume" that licensing decisions are made in the interest of the public).
94 See, e.g., Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 49 S.E. 793,797 (Ga. 1905) (statingthat "[w]hen a case
of capricious, malicious, or arbitrary action arises, the courts will deal with it as the law re-
quires"). As Fitts reveals, courts in the post-Davis era were reluctant to find that local officials
had acted in an arbitrary manner. In this case, the Georgia Supreme Court sustained the con-
viction of "Prof." J.L. Fitts, a Socialist, for violating an Atlanta ordinance requiring a permit
for street speeches. Id. Fitts delivered two or three speeches under a permit and when his
permit was withdrawn, he defied the ordinance. Id. at 794; see infra notes 242-45 and
accompanying text. The crowd that gathered to hear Fitts's unlicensed speech was orderly
until the police sought to silence Fitts. Fitts, 49 S.E. at 794. The ensuing disorder was cited by
the state supreme court as evidence that the denial of a permit was not capricious. Id. at 797.
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Moreover, the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed freedom of
speech was extraordinarily radical in 1897. The Court, at that time, was a decade
away from its first dissenting opinion arguing for this view of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 9 and twenty-eight years away from the first majority opinion to accept
this interpretation. 96 In 1897, there was nothing special about open-air preaching
that justified protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; the states had autonomy
to grant or restrict opportunities for public speech largely as they pleased, without
interference from federal courts.
Although other states were free to depart from the Massachusetts model and
offer significant protection to open-air speech,97 Davis largely halted the "flow of
a stream of precedents" such as Garrabad "that had the earmark of giving a
reasonable easement of assemblage in public places."98 By devaluing open-air
speech and stressing the proprietary powers of the government, Davis set the tone
for a generation of opinions that were plainly hostile to the idea that streets were
appropriate to use for expressive activities.99 Moreover, despite the oft-cited
9' Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("[F]reedom of speech and of the
press ... are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...."). Professor Curtis claims the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to protect First Amendment rights against restrictions by states;
he is critical of nineteenth century cases, such as United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876), which rely on the "pre-Civil War paradigm of the semi-sovereign state, free to
deprive all its citizens of fundamental rights set out in the Bill of Rights." MICHAEL KENT
CURTIs, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE" 380 (2000).
" In State v. Coleman, 113 A. 385 (Conn. 1921), the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors found that an ordinance requiring a license for open-air speeches was permissible
under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the ordinance was a violation of the state
constitution: "There can be no reasonable presumption that an unlimited discretion will not
be exercised when the ordinance itself reposes an unlimited discretion." Id. at 387. See also
Anderson v. Tedford, 85 So. 673 (Fla. 1920), in which the Florida Supreme Court found a
licensing ordinance to be unreasonable.
98 Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 151 (D.N.J. 1938), aff'd, 101 F.2d
774 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
9 The Georgia Supreme Court stated in upholding the conviction of a Socialist speaker
who claimed he had a right to speak on public streets without a license:
If Prof. Fitts' idea of constitutional law were correct, I see no reason
why every citizen should not claim a right to use the public streets for
the exercise of his trade, calling, or profession, which may be much
more essential to his welfare and that of the public than speechmaking
by the plaintiff in certiorari, however eloquent ....
Fitts, 49 S.E. at 795; see also Coughlin v. Chi. Park Dist., 4 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 1936) (stating
that under Davis and its progeny, "no citizen has a right to use at his pleasure, or on his own
terms, public property... without a permit").
In addition to courts, police officials in the early 1900s were often hostile towards open-
air speakers. In 1915, the United States Commission on Industrial Relations wrote the
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doctrine that courts could intervene to prevent discrimination, courts in the post-
Davis era deferred to the judgment of local officials and ignored discrimination
against unpopular speakers, such as Socialists."°
following:
One of the greatest sources of social unrest and bitterness has been
the attitude of the police toward public speaking. On numerous
occasions in every part of the country, the police of cities and towns
have either arbitrarily or under the cloak of a traffic ordinance,
interfered with or prohibited public speaking, both in the open and in
halls, by persons connected with organizations of which the police or
those from whom they received their orders did not approve. In many
instances such interference has been carded out with a degree of
brutality which would be incredible if it were not vouched for by
reliable witnesses.
COMM'N ON INDUS. REL., FINAL REP. 150-51 (1915). The Commission recommended that
"every reasonable opportunity should be afforded for the expression of ideas and the public
criticism of social institutions." Id. at 151. Overall, it approved the policies of Arthur Woods,
police commissioner of New York City. Id. Woods believed the right of "free assemblage
in this country is inalienable; it is a constitutional right." Arthur Woods, Reasonable
Restrictions upon Freedom of Assemblage, 9 AM. Soc. SOC'Y 31 (1914). Consequently,
Woods instructed police officers that it was their duty to "protect people in the enjoyment
of free speech and assemblage." Id. A public meeting "was not merely to be allowed,
therefore, but protected so long as it did not interfere with the rights of others; did not
obstruct the free use of the streets or sidewalks, and did not incite to violence." Id. Woods's
policies reduced the "unpleasantness" that previously characterized relations between
speakers and New York City police. 11 COMM'N ON INDUS. REL., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY, S. Doc. No. 415, at 10550-51 (1st Sess. 1916) (testimony
of Arthur Woods).
100 For example, the mayor of Mt. Vernon, New York refused to issue a permit for a
Socialist street meeting. People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 133 N.E. 364 (N.Y. 1921), writ of
error dismissed, 261 U.S. 590 (1923). The mayor even stated that as long as he was in office,
no permits would be issued for Socialist meetings. Id. at 366. Nonetheless, on November 2,
1920, the Socialists held a street meeting without a permit. Id. at 365. The speakers were
arrested and, before trial, obtained writs of habeas corpus; the speakers were then discharged
on the grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. The Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court dismissed the writs. Id. This action was sustained by the New
York Court of Appeals. Id. at 366. Drawing upon cases such as Davis, the court of appeals
held that liberty of speech did not include holding street meetings without a permit. Id.
The Socialists' claim that the mayor had arbitrarily applied the ordinance was
inappropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding. Id. See also City of Duquesne v. Fincke, 112
A. 130 (Pa. 1920), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there was no right to
hold a street meeting without a permit. Consequently, the remedy to arbitrary licensing
decisions "was not by violating the ordinance, but by mandamus to compel a proper
obedience to it." Id. at 134. But see State v. Coleman, 113 A. 385 (Conn. 1921) (holding that
the exercise of discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus, and that ordinances conferring
unlimited discretion should be declared void).
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II. DISMANTLING DAVIS
When Charles Evans Hughes returned to the Court as Chief Justice in 1930, the
state of First Amendment doctrine was nearly as dismal as when he left the Court
in 1916. Despite the 1925 ruling that the First Amendment was applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,'' as of 1930 the Court had not yet ruled
in favor of a First Amendment claim. Two 1931 rulings, Near v. Minnesota0 2 and
Stromberg v. California,1°3 were critical turning points in the history of the First
Amendment. Near restated the historic antipathy toward prior restraint of the
press." Stromberg maintained that tolerance of dissent was essential to the
"security of the Republic"'0 5 and was the first step in the abandonment of the bad-
tendency test. Near and Stromberg were followed by a series of decisions limiting
state power to restrict the content of speech." Building upon the principle that
government officials lack the power to silence their critics, the Hughes Court also
repudiated Davis and established a First Amendment right to use public property
for open-air speech, free of arbitrary licensing. 0 7 By reading the Fourteenth
Amendment as making the First Amendment applicable to the states, the Hughes
Court replaced the autonomy of states with national norms.
The Davis Court's presumption that officials would properly act when licensing
open-air speech stands in marked contrast to a central rationale of the doctrine
protecting the press from licensing: government officials, often the subject of press
criticism, cannot be trusted to license the press. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in
Near, " [c]harges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official malfeasance,
unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guaranty
is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent
10' Gidow, 268 U.S. at 666.
102 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
103 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Prior to Stromberg, the Court overturned a conviction under a
criminal syndicalism statute on due process grounds. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
The Fiske Court found there was a lack of evidence to support the charge that the speaker
advocated unlawful acts. Id. at 386. Stromberg invalidated a conviction for displaying a flag
as a symbol of opposition to organized government. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 359. The
Stromberg Court rested on free speech grounds; it was concerned that the vague statute could
be used to punish peaceful opposition to government. Id. at 369.
'0 Near, 283 U.S. at 713-15.
"' Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369 (Chief Justice Hughes wrote that the "maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.").
'06 See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (reversing a conviction for violation
of an insurrection statute).
107 See infra Part II.B.
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publication."'0 8 One.of the Court's critical steps 
in dismantling Davis was a shift to
a presumption that licensing of open-air speech 
- unless tightly confined to
content-neutral criteria - posed unacceptable 
risks of content discrimination by
licensing officials. The presumption against 
government officials, which begins
with Lovell v. City of Griffin,'09 enabled facial challenges to 
licensing ordinances
by litigants who had not applied for licenses 
and consequently could not show
discrimination.
A. Lovell
I did not ask for a permit, because I am sent by Jehovah 
to
do His work. His law is supreme and above every 
human law.
To apply for a permit to do His work would 
be an act of dis-
obedience to His commandment. It would 
be an insult to the
Most High which would in time result in my eternal 
destruction.
-Alma Lovell"'
Alma Lovell, like other Jehovah's Witnesses,"' 
distributed religious pamphlets
door-to-door without a license. When she did 
this in Griffin, Georgia, in 1936, she
violated a municipal ordinance prohibiting the 
distribution of "circulars, handbooks,
advertising, or literature of any kind" 
without a permit from the city manager."
2
Lovell was convicted and sentenced 
to fifty days in jail.13
Lovell appealed her conviction to the Court."
4 Unlike Davis, Lovell had the
benefit of the Court's post-1
9 2 5 interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as
protecting First Amendment freedoms.
- 5 Moreover, as a distributor of literature,
she was able to claim that her activities were protected 
under the First Amendment' s
Press Clause; the ordinance was a violation of 
the general rule that prior restraints
'0" Near, 283 U.S. at 722; see also infra note 184. For a more recent 
statement of this pre-
sumption, see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 
U.S. 750, 755-58 (1988).
109 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
110 Transcript of Record at 12, Lovell (No. 391).
See generally William Shepard McAninch, 
A Catalyst for the Evolution of
Constitutional Law: Jehovah's Witnesses in 
the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 997
(1987).
112 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 447. This type of ordinance was commonplace in 
America during
the 1930s. James K. Lindsay, Council and Court: 
The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939,
39 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1941).
"' Lovell, 303 U.S. at 
44 7
.
114 Id.
115 In addition to freedom of the press, Lovell claimed 
her activities were also protected
by the First Amendment's Religion and Speech Clauses, 
made applicable to states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant's Brief at 9, Lovell 
(No. 391).
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against the press are not permitted." 6 Lovell was supported by the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Workers' Defense League who declared in amicus briefs
that leaflets were especially important to minorities" 7 and that licensing ordin-
ances were used to "oppress humble people when their views and policies offend
municipal administrations.""'
The City defended the ordinance by claiming that Lovell was "not a member of
the press."" 9 Besides, the City did not license publishing but merely regulated "the
physical handling of printed matter."'2 0 Because of the presumption that the licen-
sing authority would act properly, Lovell, who had not applied for a license, was not
entitled to a contrary presumption.'
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hughes said the ordinance was a
facially invalid abridgment of press freedom.'22 Consequently, Lovell could contest
the ordinance's validity without seeking a permit." 3 The character of the law, rather
than its application, was critical; the ordinance "strikes at the very foundation of the
freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship."' 2 4 To Hughes, the
historic "struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed at the power
of the licensor" and "the ordinance in question would restore censorship in its
baldest form."'
21
116 Id. at 38.
117 Brief and Motion on Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at
5-6, Lovell (No. 391).
18 Motion and Brief on Behalf of Workers' Defense League as Amicus Curiae at 12,
Lovell (No. 391).
"1 Brief of Appellee at 4, Lovell (No. 391).
120 Id. at 14. The City also claimed that Lovell's conviction had not been based on the
content of her expression. Id. at 4.
21 See supra note 93.
122 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451.
123 Id. at 452-53. As support, Chief Justice Hughes cited his opinion in Smith v. Cahoon,
283 U.S. 553, 562 (1931). Lovell, 303 U.S. at 453. Smith involved the proprietor of a
transport company who did not apply for a license. Smith, 283 U.S. at 556. Transporters of
certain products, such as dairy and farm products, were exempt from the licensing
requirement and the Court found that the distinctions within the law were arbitrary and
unrelated to public safety. Id. at 567. In Smith, Chief Justice Hughes wrote that when a
licensing statute is facially valid, those who fail to apply for a license are unable to complain
of an anticipated improper licensingdepision. Id. at 562; see also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U.S. 539,554 (1917) (according the commissioner a presumption that licensing authority
will be executed in the public interest, "not wantonly or arbitrarily"). Chief Justice Hughes
added, "[tihis principle, however, is not applicable where a statute is invalid upon its face
and an attempt is made to enforce its penalties in violation of [a] constitutional right." Smith,
283 U.S. at 562.
124 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451.
121 Id. at 451-52; see also Near, 283 U.S. at 713-14 (claiming that the chief purpose of
the Press Clause was to prevent prior restraints). The Lovell opinion was joined by Justices
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The distrust of government licensing officials in Lovell stands in stark contrast
to the Davis Court's presumption in favor of government officials. Chief Justice
Hughes did not even mention Davis in Lovell. In effect, Davis was irrelevant; by
characterizing Lovell as a press freedom case, Hughes was able to draw upon a
longstanding view of the dangers of licensing publications. 26 Had Hughes char-
acterized Lovell' s activities as falling within the ambit of Davis, Lovell would have
been unable to prove that government officials had discriminated against her.
Hughes placed Lovell' s activities within the context of press freedom by broadly
defining the term press:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.
These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of
liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own
history abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle
of information and opinion.' 27
Moreover, the scope of press freedom was defined to include distribution as well as
publication. 128 "Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of pub-
lishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value." '129
Butler and McReynolds who had dissented in Near. In Justice Butler's discussion of prior
restraint doctrine in Near, he claimed that the arbitrary licensing power of an administrative
officer was distinct from judicial decrees against further publication of malicious material.
Id. at 736 (Butler, J., dissenting).
As Lovell shows, the generalization that the Four Horsemen - Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler - were more protective of economic liberties than
freedom of expression is not completely true. While the Four Horsemen dissented in Near
and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (overturning a conviction for insurrection), they
joined the Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (invalidating a tax
on newspapers), and in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (invalidating a state
criminal syndicalism law as applied to lawful public meetings). See also Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating a law prohibiting display of a red flag, with
Van Devanter and Sutherland joining the opinion). Moreover, the Four Horsemen did not
consistently vote in favor of economic rights. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201,246 n.255 (1994) (listing cases and showing their voting records).
The member of the Hughes Court most likely to vote against First Amendment claims
was Justice McReynolds. He dissented in Near, Stromberg, Herndon, Hague, Schneider, and
Thornhill.
126 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451-52.
127 Id. at 452.
128 id.
29 Id. (quoting Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,733 (1877)). After noting that recent cases
such as Near emphasized the importance of protecting press freedom from "every sort of
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Although Lovell did not overrule Davis, the case raised provocative questions
about Davis's continuing validity. Did Lovell's presumption against licensing of
press activities also apply to other forms of expression such as open-air speaking?
Was speaking in public places still a privilege, exercised at the discretion of local
officials, or was it classified as a right? Stated differently, was the protection of the
First Amendment's Speech Clause identical to that provided by the Press Clause?
To what extent did the First Amendment protect a citizen's access to public property
for expressive purposes? The Court confronted these questions in several cases
decided shortly after Lovell.
B. Hague
We hear about constitutional rights, free speech and the free
press. Every time I hear those words I say to myself, "That man
is a Red, that man is a Communist." You never heard a real
American talk in that manner.
-Mayor Frank Hague, 1938130
Frank Hague and his political machine ruthlessly controlled Jersey City, New
Jersey from 1917 to 1947.13 Industry was safe in Jersey City, Hague boasted,
infringement," id. at 452, the Court added a "see also" footnote citation to seven cases, id.
at n.2. Read together, these cases emphasize the importance of protecting the distribution of
printed materials. However, these cases involved content-based prohibitions, see, e.g., Ex
parte Campbell, 221 P. 952 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (holding that a ban on printing or
distributing material espousing the precepts of the Industrial Workers of the World violated
the state constitution), or judicially-created exemptions for preferred types of speech, such
as political commentary, see, e.g., Coughlin v. Sullivan, 126 A. 177, 177 (N.J. 1924)
(holding that political pamphlets were exempt from an ordinance restricting "circulars,
pamphlets, and other advertising matter"). Only one of the cases cited by the Lovell Court
involved a power similar to the Griffin, Georgia licensing ordinance. In Dearborn Publishing
Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 F. 479 (N.D. Ohio 1921), the mayor of Cleveland sought to sanction
a newspaper, the Dearborn Independent, for publishing anti-Semitic articles he regarded as
a breach of peace. Id. at 480-81. The mayor instructed police to arrest anyone distributing
the paper on the streets if additional anti-Semitic articles were published. Id. The paper
obtained an injunction. Id. at 486. Federal district Judge Westenhaver wrote in terms that
would be reflected in later opinions such as Lovell:
If defendants' action were sustained, the constitutional liberty of every
citizen freely to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible only for the abuse of that right, would be placed at
the mercy of every public official who for the moment was clothed
with authority to preserve the public peace, and the right to a free press
would likewise be destroyed.
Id. at 485.
130 THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 154 (Robert Andrews ed., 1993).
131 See DAYTON DAVID MCKEAN, THE Boss: THE HAGUE MACHINE IN ACTION (1940).
1241
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1193
because he would not allow "Un-American" labor groups like the Committee for
Industrial Organization (CIO) to meet, picket, or pass out literature in the city.'32
Hague firmly believed that Davis authorized his policies, a view supported by the
New Jersey courts.133 Nonetheless, when federal courts heard challenges to Hague's
policies, those courts found ways to bypass Davis.
In November 1937, New Jersey CIO leaders announced it was time for a show-
down between the CIO and "I-Am-The-Law-Hague."'' M The CIO planned a massive
drive to organize workers in Jersey City; if necessary, the CIO announced that it
would test the validity of Jersey City laws prohibiting distribution of leaflets and
requiring licenses for public assemblies. 135 Hague's machine responded viciously.
On November 29, 1937, CIO organizers and sympathizers were illegally searched,
leaflets were confiscated, and although few CIO organizers were arrested, most were
deported from Jersey City.'36
The CIO and the American Civil Liberties Union applied for permits to hold
outdoor meetings in December 1937, and a variety of Jersey City veteran's groups,
inspired by Hague's machine, opposed the granting of permits for "thoroughly Un-
American" speakers. 37 Based on this opposition, the Jersey City director of public
safety refused the permits because the meetings "would lead to riots, disturbances,
132 As Judge Clark wrote,
[The] deliberate policy of Jersey City is this. Certain individuals
and groups of individuals ... are alleged to be the kind of persons and
to hold the kinds of opinions to which the people of Jersey City or a
majority of them are, to use a current and expressive medical term -
allergic.
Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 130 (D.N.J. 1938), affd, 101 F.2d 774
(3d Cir.), aftd, 307 U.S. 469 (1939).
133 In 1922, the state's highest court held that the mayor and fire chief of Rahway were
justified in using a stream of water from a fire hose to sweep a Socialist speaker off of a
platform, "wetting those in the immediate neighborhood thereof," and dispersing a public
meeting. Harwood v. Trembley, 116 A. 430,431 (N.J. 1922). The Socialists had been denied
a permit to hold the meeting and the court added, A la Davis, that "liberty of speech no more
authorizes a citizen to appropriate to his own use'the public property of a community for the
purpose of exercising that guaranty than it permits, him to occupy in invitum the private
property of a fellow citizen for the same purpose." 1d. In 1938, the state supreme court
reaffirmed its view that Davis was still the law of the land; liberty of speech did not include
the right to speak on public property without a permit. Thomas v. Casey, 1 A.2d 866, 869
(N.J. 1938).
"3 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774, 778 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
135 id.
136 Id. As Professor Chafee wrote, "Mayor Frank Hague fought the closed shop by
establishing the closed city." CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 410.
' See Hague, 101 F.2d at 803-04.
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and disorderly assemblage."'' 8 Rather than violate the public assembly ordinance,
the CIO sought an injunction from the federal district court.'
After a lengthy trial in 1938, Judge William Clark issued a decree prohibiting
Hague and his associates from excluding CIO representatives from Jersey City,
restraining their movement within the city, interfering with the distribution of
leaflets or the display of signs, and "placing any previous restraint" upon public
meetings. " The city's ban on leafleting was facially unconstitutional under Lovell,
decided earlier in 1938.' 4
As for public meetings, Judge Clark found that there was an "easement of
assemblage" in municipal parks. 4 How could this "easement of assemblage" be
reconciled with Davis? Judge Clark claimed that Hughes's comments about the
municipal power to forbid public speaking in public places was dictum;
consequently, the language in the United States Supreme Court opinion affirming
the Massachusetts court was "double dictum."'
43
138 Id. at 806 (Davis, J., dissenting) (quoting a letter from Daniel Casey, Jersey City
director of public safety). As the Court of Appeals stated, the "cries of impending riot raised
by the appellants are not candid. In other words, Mayor Hague and his associates, reversing
the usual procedure, troubled the waters in order to fish in them." Id. at 784.
'9 CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 412.
140 The district court's findings of fact and decree are reprinted as an appendix to the
appellate court's opinion. Hague, 101 F.2d at 791-96.
Judge Clark's views on prior restraint were not completely consistent. He believed that
the doctrine of cases such as Near and Lovell was not fully applicable to public meetings.
Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 146. In commenting on procedures that he believed to be consti-
tutional, he noted that licensing authorities could deny a license if there were proof that the
applicants "have spoken in the past in such fashion that audiences similar to those to be
reasonably expected in Jersey City have indulged in breaches of the peace." Id. Moreover,
if there were proof of previous breaches of peace,
we think that either a copy of the speech to be currently delivered could
be required and censored in the light of the reasonable apprehension of
disorder of 'firm and courageous' city officials or else the speakers
could be bound over to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
Id. He admitted this was a system of censorship and public speeches might "suffer in
spontaneity but . .. the listening public would welcome the compensating gain in
thoughtfulness." Id. at 148.
The day after issuing his opinion, Judge Clark wrote to Professor Chafee, stating "I am
sure you have been discouraged in the past with the curious tendency on the part of a certain
school of liberals to overlook the countervailing considerations of public order. In my
opinion I have tried to give them some reasonable scope." SMITH, supra note 19, at 196
(quoting Letter from William Clark to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Oct. 28, 1938)).
' Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 144.
142 id. at 145.
141 Id. at 151.
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The Third Circuit affirmed the injunction1 " and provided an expansive
discussion of the First Amendment's application to public assemblies. Drawing
heavily upon Near, the appellate court concluded, "[there is strong analogy between
the right freely to publish the written or printed word and the right here in issue
freely to speak in a public assembly."' 145 The licensing scheme was repugnant to
free speech because it allowed government officials to destroy their opponents.
Under Hague's application of the assembly ordinance, "political speakers might
not stump a city in an election if their opponents objected to what they had to say
and threatened disorder. The strict application of such a rule would result
eventually in the existence of but one political party as is now the case under
,,141totalitarian governments.
The appellate court regarded Davis as both irrelevant and pass6. First, Davis
was distinguished from this case on technical grounds because Davis never applied
for a permit; in this case, the appellees sought permits. 147  Second, and more
significant, the Third Circuit regarded Davis as overruled by the "modern doctrine
of protection of liberty of speech and assembly" pronounced in cases such as Near
and Lovell.148 There was "but small discussion" of civil liberties in Davis and its
view of the powers of municipal authorities was outdated. 4 9 The appellate court,
in language mirroring William F. Davis's unsuccessful claims more than forty years
earlier, added:
[W]e think it cannot now be doubted that a city owns and its
officials administer its streets and parks, not as private
proprietors, but as trustees for the people. While streets and
parks are to be administered primarily for the use of the people
for travel and recreation it is equally certain that, consistent with
such uses, the public places of a city must be open for the use of
the people in order that they may exercise their rights of free
speech and assembly. If this were not so it is obvious that these
144 Hague, 101 F.2d at 791. The decree permitted Jersey City to adopt a policy of
forbidding all meetings of any kind upon the streets or public places of Jersey City, other
than parks. Id. at 796. The court of appeals struck this provision from the decree. Id. at 787.
145 Id. at 784.
146 Id. The appellate court added that even if the ordinance were valid, it had been applied
in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "The criterion imposed by the authorities of Jersey City upon the right to speak
therein is simply whether or not the individual who is to speak is a right thinking person in
the view of those who constitute the city authorities. No other test is applied." Id. at 786.
"' Id. at 785. Judge Davis thought the majority was relying on a "distinction without a
difference." Id. at 800 (Davis, J., dissenting).
'4' Id. at 785. Judge Davis said there is not a "line, word or even a hint" in cases such as
Near and Lovell expressly overruling or modifying Davis. Id. at 801 (Davis, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 785.
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rights would be but empty forms for those unable to obtain
suitable private places in which to exercise them.150
In their briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, the parties offered starkly
differing views of Davis's validity. Hague claimed that cases such as Lovell did not
create a right of "free expression" that protected open-air speech to the same extent
as freedom of the press.' 5' The respondents countered that Davis was no longer
good law; speech in public places was an essential part of American democracy
and the trend of the Court's decisions in the 1930s was to provide substantial
protection to speech.
52
The Supreme Court sustained the lower court, but no opinion commanded a
majority. 13 Remarkably, Justice Roberts's plurality opinion found the Jersey City
ordinances void, but sidestepped the question of Davis's continuing validity.' His
attempt to distinguish the two cases was hyper-technical. The Boston ordinance was
not solely aimed at free expression, but also included within its scope other activities
such as discharging firearms and selling goods. 55 The Jersey City ordinance, in
contrast, only dealt with public assembly and was "not a general measure to promote
the public convenience in the use of the streets or parks."' 5 6 Then, while claiming
that Davis was not being overruled, Justice Roberts offered language that plainly
undercut Davis:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
150 Id.
'' Brief on Behalf of Petitioners at40-41, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (No. 651). The petitioners added, "[tihere is not and never has been any general right
of 'free expression' recognized by any court. The use of such a catch-all, cover-all phrase is
attended by the gravest risks of confused ideology, as is the use of any other lump-concept."
Id. at 41.
'52 Respondents' Brief at 54, 63-64, Hague, 307 U.S. 496 (No. 651); see also Brief of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association, As Friends of the Court
at 7-11, Hague, 307 U.S. 496 (No. 651) (arguing that "[fireedom of assembly is an essential
element of the American democratic system").
113 Hague, 307 U.S. 496.
114 See id.
"' See id. at 515.
156 id.
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States to use the streets and parks for communication of views
on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination
to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with
peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation,
be abridged or denied.'57
Roberts cited no authorities or sources to support his assertion that streets and parks
had been used "time out of mind" for expressive purposes. 58 By claiming that the
Court was protecting a longstanding tradition, Justice Roberts masked the break
from Davis "and the way things had been time in mind."'
159
Hague signaled that the proprietary authority recognized in Davis had been
brushed aside.' 6° Although Justice Roberts's plurality opinion relied on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this was prompt-
ly forgotten. 6' His plurality opinion in Hague soon came to stand for a First
Amendment right of all speakers, regardless of citizenship, to use public streets and
parks to discuss political and religious matters.'62
157 Id. at 515-16. None of the other members of the Court finding the permit ordinance
invalid acknowledged the break from Davis. Justice Stone's separate opinion emphasized
that First Amendment rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Id. at 519. This, of course, is in stark contrast with the Davis Court's position on the
Fourteenth Amendment, a matter Stone did not mention. Justice Butler was the only member
of the Court to comment on Roberts's effort to distinguish the Jersey City ordinance from
the Boston ordinance. Both ordinances were identical in principle, thus he believed that
Davis prevailed. Id. at 533 (Butler, J., dissenting). Justice McReynolds dissented because
"management of such intimate local affairs ... is beyond the competency of federal courts."
Id. at 532 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
15' See id. at 515-16.
9 Wertheimer, supra note 7, at 236.
'60 As an immediate consequence, a public celebration of the Hague decision was held
without a permit in Jersey City on June 12, 1939. Hague Safeguards Rally of His Foes, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1939, at 1. State courts soon regarded Hague as overruling Davis. M. GLENN
ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 125-128 (2d ed. rev. 1981).
161 Justice Roberts's preference for the Privileges and Immunities Clause was short-lived.
In subsequent cases he relied upon the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("[T]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in
[the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment.").
'62 See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,293 (1951) (citing Hague as the beginning
point for an analysis of municipal power to control the use of public streets for the expression
of religious views). In Kunz, the Court found a New York City ordinance requiring permits
for public worship meetings on streets unconstitutional. Id. at 294-95. Prior to Hague, the
Court treated the same ordinance as not presenting a substantial federal question. See Smith
v. New York, 292 U.S. 606 (1934). In his dissenting opinion in Kunz, Justice Jackson noted
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Despite Hague's sweeping repudiation of the idea that open-air speech occurs
"at the sufferance of the state,"' 63 Justice Roberts's plurality opinion is very prelim-
inary. The detailed rules established in the district court's decree were set aside;' 64
Justice Roberts believed that courts should not rewrite facially invalid ordinances. 1' 6
Thus, the Hague plurality opinion provided only very broad answers to the questions
regarding municipal regulation of open-air expression. Roberts recognized that
local governments had the duty to "maintain order" and regulate the streets for all
citizens." And, the "uncontrolled" official discretion exercised under the Jersey
City meetings ordinance was unconstitutional because it served as an "instrument
of arbitrary suppression of free expression.' 67 A major step toward filling in the
details would occur in Schneider v. State,' 68 decided a few months after Hague.
C. Schneider
This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that
of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The
phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used.
-Justice Owen Roberts, 1939169
The Court consolidated four cases involving municipal control of leafleting in
Schneider.170 One of the ordinances required a license to engage in door-to-door
canvassing, solicitation, and leaflet distribution and presented questions relating to
that municipal ordinances requiring permits for public assemblies "[u]ntil recently" had been
widely regarded as constitutional. Kunz, 340 U.S. at 306 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The reason
for the different results in Smith and Kunz "must be found in the Court, not in the ordinance."
Id. at 308.
163 Kalven, supra note 19, at 13.
164 See, e.g., Hague, 101 F.2d at 795 (asserting that permits for park meetings could only
be denied if the time or place of the applicant's proposed use was in conflict with other
park uses).
165 Hague, 307 U.S. at 518.
'6' Id. at 516.
167 Id.
16' 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
69 Id. at 161 (footnote omitted). The key Hughes-era First Amendment opinions discussed
in this Article were written by either Chief Justice Hughes or Justice Roberts, both Hoover
appointees. For a discussion of their roles in other types of cases, see Richard D. Friedman,
Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1891, 1935-74 (1994).
170 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 147 n.*.
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content discrimination.'' The other ordinances prohibited leafleting in the streets
and raised a different set of content-neutral questions.'
1. Licensing
The Irvington, New Jersey licensing ordinance was violated by Clara Schneider,
a Jehovah's Witness who regarded applying for a license to be an act of
disobedience to Jehovah.'" Schneider's conviction was sustained by New Jersey's
highest court, which distinguished Lovell because that case did not involve can-
vassing or soliciting.' 4 The state court ruled that protecting citizens from fraudulent
solicitation was a legitimate exercise of police power.'75 Schneider's appeal to the
Court drew heavily upon Lovell, arguing that the licensing ordinance was an invalid
prior restraint. 1
7 6
Justice Roberts, writing for all members of the Court except Justice McReynolds,
found that the licensing ordinance was not narrowly drawn to prevent fraud or
trespass. 17 7 Rather, it gave the police censorial power "to say some ideas may, while
others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens; some persons may, while others
may not, disseminate information from house to house.', 7 8 Drawing upon the
historic struggle against press licensing, Justice Roberts wrote that "a censorship
through license... strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees."'
79
Significantly, Justice Roberts did not describe the activities of the Jehovah's
Witnesses as falling within the First Amendment's Free Exercise of Religion Clause;
this was "speech and press"'" ° and the scope of the ordinance reached anyone "who
wishes to present his views on political, social or economic questions.''. One year
171 Id. at 157-58, 163.
171 Id. at 154-56.
i' Town of Irvington v. Schneider, 3 A.2d 609, 609 (N.J. 1939).
174 Id. at 610.
171 Id.; see also Dziatkiewicz v. Township of Maplewood, 178 A. 205 (N.J. 1935)
(sustaining an ordinance similar to the one in Schneider as a valid police power regulation).
176 Petitioner's Brief at 21, Schneider 308 U.S. 147 (No. 11). Although Schneider claimed
her activities came within Lovell's definition of press freedom, id. at 12, she also claimed her
activities were protected under the First Amendment as freedom of religion and speech, id.
at 8-9. See also id. at 31 ("[Flreedom of worship and religious liberty are inherent rights of
equal value with freedom of speech, press and assembly.").
"I Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164.
178 id.
179 id.
180 id.
181 Id. at 163; cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) (invalidating a licensing
requirement for labor speakers; if such a requirement were valid, it could apply to anyone
"who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause").
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after Schneider, though, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,8 2 Justice Roberts wrote that
Jehovah's Witnesses were protected from arbitrary licensing schemes by the Free
Exercise Clause. 1 3 Read together, Lovell, Hague, Schneider, and Cantwell show the
Court's hostility toward censorial power cut across the Religion, Press, Speech, and
Assembly Clauses. By 1940, the break from the past was clear; discretionary
licensing schemes affecting open-air speech were no longer presumed to be
constitutional. "
2. Content-Neutral Restrictions
Municipalities began prohibiting or regulating the distribution of leaflets in the
1880s as a means of preventing littering, street obstruction, and similar problems in
rapidly urbanizing communities. These ordinances were commonly accepted by the
judiciary.'85 In Schneider, the Court addressed three leafleting ordinances that had
been upheld by lower courts; municipal power to prohibit leafleting was deeply
,82 310 U.S. 296 (1940). At issue was a statute prohibiting solicitation for any "religious,
charitable, or philanthropic cause" unless a government official determined that the cause
was religious or a bona fide charity or philanthropy. Id. at 301-02. Justice Roberts observed
that the state official had boundless discretion in making these judgments:
If he finds that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes
a crime. He is not to issue a certificate as a matter of course. His
decision to issue or refuse it involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of
judgment, and the formation of opinion. He is authorized to withhold
his approval if he determines that the cause is not a religious one. Such
a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive
is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment ....
Id. at 305.
'3 After Cantwell, the Court referred to the expressive activities of Jehovah's Witnesses
as combining elements of freedom of religion and freedom of expression, Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943) (noting that the distribution of religious literature
is "more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature"), or placed
these activities under the protection of the Religion, Press, and Speech Clauses, Largent
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943) (holding that a licensing statute "abridges the freedom
of religion, of the press and of speech"). The current Court regards the Jehovah's Witnesses
cases of the 1930s and early 1940s as protecting religious and nonreligious speech. See
generally Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
(finding unconstitutional a licensing ordinance for door-to-door canvassing and literature
distribution).
'" In Cantwell, the State claimed that the judiciary could correct arbitrary action by the
licensing official, but Justice Roberts considered that remedy to be inadequate: "a judicial
remedy for abuses in the system of licensing still leaves that system one of previous restraint
which, in the field of free speech and press, we have held inadmissible." Cantwell, 310 U.S.
at 306.
' See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 96 N.W. 149 (Neb. 1903); Wettengel v. City of Denver,
39 P. 343 (Colo. 1895).
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entrenched and the lower courts found ways to distinguish and limit Lovell.186 For
example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting
street distribution of leaflets in Worcester. 187 Drawing upon its previous decisions,1
8
as well as those of other courts,' 89 the Massachusetts court found the ordinance to
be a reasonable regulation of the use of streets; the law did not preclude the sale of
newspapers, nor did it prevent free distribution of leaflets in other places.' 90 As an
anti-litter measure, the Worcester ordinance was "not in any sense directed toward
the suppression of ideas, theories or opinions."' 9 Lovell was distinguished because
the Worcester ordinance did not allow discretionary licensing.' 92
Only Justice McReynolds, whose tenure on the Court began in 1914, voted to
uphold the handbill ordinances.'93 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, echoed
Hague and reinforced the idea that streets were a uniquely important forum for
speech.'94 Justice Roberts wrote, "the streets are natural and proper places for the
dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place."' 95 By this powerful statement, the Court discarded
several decades of municipal law in which restrictions on open-air speech were
justified by the availability of other outlets.
Schneider introduced balancing into the Court's First Amendment method-
ology. 196 Justice Roberts observed that the interest in keeping streets clean was
186 See City of Milwaukee v. Snyder, 283 N.W. 301 (Wis.) (involving an ordinance aimed
at preventing littering), rev'd sub nom., Schneider, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); People v. Young,
85 P.2d 231 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1938) (addressing a Los Angeles ordinance that
prohibits the distribution of handbills only in limited places), rev'd sub nom., Schneider, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 18 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. 1938) (holding that the
ordinance reasonably regulates the use of streets in order to prevent littering), rev'd sub nom.,
Schneider, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). However, some state courts invalidated handbill ordinances
as a result of Lovell. See, e.g., Dearborn v. Ansell, 287 N.W. 551 (Mich. 1939).
187 Commonwealth v. Kimball, 13 N.E.2d 18, 22 (Mass. 1938).
188 See, e.g., id. at 21 ("The distribution of handbills or similar papers in streets tends to
annoy travelers and abutters, obstruct to the streets, and to litter them with paper.").
'89 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 96 N.W. 149, 150 (Neb. 1903) (holding that a reasonable
police regulation is not invalid because it may incidentally affect the exercise of a
constitutional right); see also Young, 85 P.2d at 234 (stating that the conclusion that handbills
may be prohibited "finds support in the authorities").
190 Kimball, 13 N.E.2d at 21-22.
19' Nichols, 18 N.E. 2d at 168.
192 Id. at 168-69.
193 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 163.
195 Id.
196 See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). Professor Aleinikoff observed that this development was not
explained by the Court. "No Justice explained why such a methodology was a proper form
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insufficient to justify a prohibition on leafleting.' 97 And, if there were indirect con-
sequences, such as litter, from the distribution of literature, municipalities would
have to employ means protective of free expression.'9 8 Stated differently, judicial
deference to municipal authorities was old-fashioned;'9 9 even rather mundane laws
designed to promote content-neutral interests would receive heightened judicial
scrutiny. Although Justice Roberts did not cite footnote four of Carolene
Products,200 the "modem" theory ofjudicial review articulated in Carolene Products
was central to Schneider. Justice Roberts wrote that freedom of speech and press
were critical to "free government by free men. 20 ' Consequently,
where legislative abridgement of the rights is asserted, the
courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged
legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise,
the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of
the rights. 2
of constitutional construction, nor did any purport to be doing anything novel or contro-
versial. Yet balancing was a major break with the past . I.." d. at 948-49.
'9' Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162.
198 Id. at 162, 164.
' For an example of the judicial deference commonplace prior to Schneider, see Nichols,
18 N.E. 2d at 169 ("Whether the legitimate objects of the section could be substantially
accomplished by less sweeping provisions is a matter for the consideration of the city's
legislative body and not for us.").
200 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Professor Peter
Linzer erroneously claims that the first use of Carolene Products's footnote four was in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote
and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan
Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 293 (1995). Justice Murphy's Thornhill opinion
paraphrases and quotes Schneider's language regarding the importance ofj udicial protection
of First Amendment rights. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95-96. There is no substantive difference
between Thornhill and Schneider; the difference is purely cosmetic as Thornhill cites
Carolene Products while Schneider does not. Therefore, Schneider should be recognized as
the first application of footnote four.
201 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
202 Id.
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Did this special judicial posture apply to all speech, regardless of subject matter?
One of the ordinances addressed in Schneider prohibited distribution of both
commercial and noncommercial materials on the sidewalks of Los Angeles.0 3 A
leaflet announcing a meeting concerning the Spanish Civil War included the
words"Admission 250 and 50.204 The Superior Court of Los Angeles County
regarded the leaflet as "commercial advertising rather than the expression of
one's views."2 5 Hence, the State claimed before the Supreme Court that freedom
of the press was not affected by application of the ordinance to a commercial
advertisement.
2°6
In that portion of Schneider dealing with the ordinances prohibiting handbill
distribution, Justice Roberts did not refer to a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial messages.20 7 However, in discussing the Irvington, New Jersey
licensing ordinance, Justice Roberts indicated that commercial soliciting could be
subject to a licensing requirement.2"' If commercial solicitation could be treated
differently than religious or political solicitation, could municipalities also
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial leaflets? The answer came
three years later in Valentine v. Chrestensen.
2
D
9
203 Id. at 154-55.
204 People v. Young, 85 P.2d 231, 235 (Cal. App. 1938), rev'd sub nom., Schneider, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
205 Id. The California court considered the law's impact on the right to express one' s views
(freedom of expression) and the right to engage in business (property rights). Classifying the
handbill in question as a commercial advertisement brought property rights into play. The
court stated,
We do not find the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process to be superior to that which protects one
from being deprived of his liberty without due process; the latter is not,
any more than the former, an absolute right; each may be abridged by
a reasonable exercise of the police power for the public benefit.
Id.
2"6 Appellee's Brief at 20, Young, 308 U.S. 147(No. 715); see also Fifth Ave. Coach Co.
v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911) (upholding a ban on the display of advertising on
motor vehicles as a reasonable exercise of police power, without addressing any First
Amendment issues).
207 See Schneider, 308 U.S. 147.
208 Id. at 165.
20' 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Six members of the Schneider Court, Justices Stone, Roberts,
Black, Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas, also participated in Chrestensen. The new members
of the Court hearing Chrestensen were Justices Murphy, Byrnes, and Jackson.
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D. Valentine
Such men as Thomas Paine, John Milton and Thomas
Jefferson were not fighting for the right to peddle commercial
advertising.
-Judge Jerome Frank
210
In 1940, "Captain" F.J. Chrestensen, owner of a former U.S. Navy submarine,
sought to exhibit his submarine at the New York City-owned docks in Battery
Park.2" He was refused permission to do so; nonetheless, he obtained permission
to dock at a state-owned pier in the East River.21 2 Chrestensen prepared handbills
inviting the public to take guided tours to "SEE how men live in a Hell Diver." '
Police officials informed Chrestensen that distribution of commercial handbills
violated a municipal ordinance, but noncommercial handbills were permissible.2"4
Chrestensen then revised his handbill, deleting references to prices, competent
guides, and the colorful phrases such as "Hell Diver." ' On the other side of the
handbill, under the headline "Submarine Refused Permission To Dock At Any City
Owned Pier By Commissioner of Docks McKenzie," Chrestensen protested the
"dictatorial manner" of the docks commissioner.
216
After the police prevented distribution of Chrestensen's revised handbill, he
obtained an injunction from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York; the district court read Schneider as protecting distribution of
both commercial and noncommercial handbills. 217 The Second Circuit agreed with
the lower court's interpretation of Schneider and affirmed the injunction.218 Counsel
for New York City sought to save the ordinance by claiming it would only apply to
210 Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 524 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
211 ld. at 512.
212 id.
213 Transcript of Record at 18C, Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (No. 707).
214 Chrestensen, 122 F.2d at 512. In 1921, a New York court ruled that "[i]t would be a
dangerous and un-American thing" to restrict noncommercial leaflets and limited the
ordinance to commercial expression. People v. Johnson, 191 N.Y.S. 750, 751 (1921). The
ordinance was formally amended in 1938 to include language stating that the ordinance
restricted only "commercial or business advertising matter." Chrestensen, 122 F.2d at 512.
215 Brief for Respondent at 2, Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (No. 707). For the revised version
of the handbill, see Transcript of Record at 18A, Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (No. 707).
2,6 Transcript of Record at 18B, Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (No. 707).
217 Chrestensen, 34 F. Supp. 596, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
210 Chrestensen, 122 F.2d at 514.
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primarily commercial handbills, but the appellate court found this to be an elusive
distinction, one which vested arbitrary authority in police officials.219
Before the Supreme Court, New York City argued that Schneider did not
overrule precedents such as Packer Corp. v. Utah,2 1 in which the Court regarded
commercial advertising restrictions as within the police power. Commercial
advertising did not aid the process of self-government, nor did it fit within the scope
of the First Amendment's protection.2 2 ' Additionally, the decisions of the lower
courts enabled business owners to "flood the streets of our cities with commercial
advertising under the guise of exercising the right of freedom of the press. '"222
In an opinion issued two weeks after the oral argument, the Court unanimously
reversed the lower courts in a "casual, almost offhand" manner.223 To the Court, the
New York City ordinance was a business regulation, not a "speech" restriction.224
The special role of courts in protecting freedom of expression, advanced in
Schneider, was inapplicable because "purely commercial advertising" was outside
the protection of the First Amendment. 22 That is, because commercial speakers
did not have a right to use the City's property, the New York City ordinance did
not trigger judicial scrutiny of the state's interests and the methods employed to
serve those interests. "Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue
a gainful occupation in the streets," Justice Roberts wrote, "are matters for legis-
lative judgment."226
29 Id. at 515. The court of appeals asked, "How much is 'primarily?' 'Primarily commer-
cial' presumably signifies a test quantitative in amount; a limited dross of commercialism
does not vitiate, though a more substantial amount may, and presumably will." Id. Motive
would also be a factor, requiring police officials to
weigh motives or intent to determine the noncommercial nature of an
enterprise .... In net result the police officers administering the
regulation are to be arbiters -just as they undertook to be here - of
the quantum of advertising as against protest and of the purpose of the
citizen in speaking and writing.
Id.
220 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
22 Brief for Petitioner at 15-17, Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (No. 707).
222 Id. at 36.
223 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,514(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). Alex
Kozinski and Stuart Banner report that the papers of Chief Justice Stone and Justices
Douglas and Jackson, available in the Library of Congress, do not contain case files for
Chrestensen, nor did these Justices refer to the case in their correspondence. "All this
suggests that in 1942, the Justices considered the question whether the First Amendment has
any application to advertising to be one that was easily resolved and not very important."
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech,
71 TEx. L. REv. 747, 758 (1993).
224 Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 53 n.1.
225 Id. at 54.
226 Id.
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Given that New York City had to absorb the consequences of noncommercial
leafleting, such as cleaning and caring for the streets, what additional burden did
commercial leafleting create? Stated differently, are people less likely to discard a
noncommercial handbill than a commercial handbill?227 The appellate court doubted
that commercial handbills would cause more litter than noncommercial handbills,
228
and questioned whether the ordinance "accomplishes enough to be worth saving."229
The Supreme Court, however, was completely uninterested in this line of inquiry.
Nor was the Court interested in the problem of arbitrary enforcement of a law
distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial handbills. Rather than
fearing that municipal officials would restrict noncommercial speech, the Court
feared that commercial speakers would engage in ruses.23 Justice Roberts claimed
Chrestensen attached his protest to the commercial message merely to evade the
commercial ban.23' "If that evasion were successful, every merchant who desires to
broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a
moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's command. 232
Assuming commercial speech poses problems, such as fraud or deception,
which justify distinct status from noncommercial speech, does this necessarily
mean that a litter law may also distinguish between commercial and noncom-
mercial expression? Fifty-one years after Chrestensen, the Court held in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 233 that public safety and aesthetic problems
caused by distribution of commercial and noncommercial materials could not be
addressed by a restriction solely aimed at commercial speech. The Discovery
Network Court found that a municipal ordinance banning news racks containing
commercial speech, while allowing newsracks containing newspapers, "place[d] too
much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech [and] ... the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular
interests that the city has asserted."2 Of course, Discovery Network acknowledged
227 Compare Coughlin v. Sullivan, 126 A. 177 (N.J. 1924) (finding that "[i]t is a matter
of common knowledge" that advertising handbills are likely to result in litter; political
materials are likely to be retained by recipients), with City of Milwaukee v. Kassen, 234
N.W. 352 (Wis. 1931) (finding that it is untrue that commercial handbills are more likely to
be thrown in the street than political handbills).
228 Chrestensen, 122 F.2d at 513 n.1 (1941).
229 ld. at 513.
230 See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 55.
231 id.
232 Id. The Court of Appeals did not view Chrestensen's combination of messages as a
subterfuge. Chrestensen, 122 F.2d at 516. Judge Frank, in a dissenting opinion, thought
Chrestensen's commercial motivation was plain. Id. at 518-20 (Frank, J., dissenting).
233 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
234 Id. at 424.
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that commercial speech is entitled to limited First Amendment protection, a view
contrary to Chrestensen.
35
Why was the Chrestensen Court unwilling to confer some protection on
commercial speech? The answer comes by contrasting Chrestensen with cases in-
volving Jehovah's Witnesses who distributed leaflets announcing religious meetings
on one side and invitations to purchase books on the other side. One year after
Chrestensen, the Court declared that the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses were
"clearly religious" and not subject to commercial leaflet ordinances 236 or licensing
taxes applicable to commercial "hucksters. '237 The advertising and sale of literature
did not "transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. 238 To the Court, the
sale of literature by Jehovah's Witnesses was simply incidental to the main object
of preaching the tenets of their faith, a highly protected form of expression.
Captain Chrestensen's speech, in contrast, was merely ancillary to his business.
That is, whatever value Chrestensen' s protest might have had as political discourse,
it was tainted by its attachment to a commercial message motivated by business
interests. Moreover, his tours were akin to motion pictures, which, at that time, were
denied First Amendment protection because movie exhibition was a "spectacle[],"
a business conducted for profit. 39 Under the Carolene Products view of the
Constitution, regulation of economic activities - including control of speech pro-
moting those activities - was not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.24 To
confer First Amendment protection to commercial speech in 1942 would have gone
against that era's new constitutional order.
Chrestensen bears a striking resemblance to Davis. In both cases, there is no
right to use public property for expressive purposes. Accordingly, whether and under
what circumstances speakers are allowed to use public property are matters for
legislative judgment. Justice Roberts's opinions in Hague and Schneider undercut
Davis without directly acknowledging their attacks. Similarly in Chrestensen, he
preserved Davis in the context of commercial expression without acknowledging
Chrestensen's debt to Davis. Despite Justice Roberts's insistence that the Court
235 See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54-55.
236 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
237 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
238 Id. at 111; see also Largeniv. Texas, 318 U.S. 418,420 (1943), stating thatthe Jehovah's
Witnesses "look upon their work as Christian and charitable. To them it is not selling books
or papers but accepting contributions to further the work in which they are engaged."
239 Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915).
Obviously, the rationale of Mutual Film posed a threat to other media industries and the
Court ruled in 1952 that motion pictures, like books, newspapers, and magazines, are entitled
to First Amendment protection even though they are produced by profit-seeking firms.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
2"0 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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had "unequivocally held that the streets are proper places" for distributing
information, 24 Chrestensen shows that support to be equivocal.
I. ORDERED FREEDOM
On August 17, 1904, "Prof." J.L. Fitts, a Socialist, defied an Atlanta, Georgia
public meeting ordinance by delivering a speech on the streets of downtown Atlanta
without a permit.242 Handbills announcing the meeting included the following:
Prof. Fitts has been refused a permit. He will speak under the
right guaranteed by the 1st Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which was proposed by Jefferson and approved by
Washington. If interrupted, the case will be carried to the
United States Supreme Court. Shall we, who built the streets, be
deprived of their use for lawfully assembling to discuss our
condition and needs? Come and see. Be early and get a good
place. Don't Block Sidewalks or Streets.243
After briefly speaking, Fitts was arrested and his conviction was upheld by the
Georgia Supreme Court.2" His case raised an interesting question: Could public
safety be protected through measures less invasive than a permit scheme? Because
the state supreme court disagreed with Fitts's constitutional claim of a right to use
the streets,245 it did not consider the appropriateness of less restrictive methods.
Other courts finding permit schemes to be invalid, however, had considered
such matters. For example, in 1888, the Kansas Supreme Court found that munici-
palities could regulate, but not prohibit, parades and public demonstrations.244 The
Kansas court outlined permissible forms of regulation:
[Clertain restrictions may be necessary to preserve the public
from harm. It might be proper, on account of the peculiar
241 Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
242 Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 49 S.E. 793, 793-94 (Ga. 1905).
243 Id. at 794 (emphasis added). The tactic of violating municipal permit ordinances was
commonly used by Socialist speakers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Wertheimer, supra note 7, at 175-215. Wobblies also violated permit ordinances, often
stating that the only permit they had was the First Amendment. FELLOW WORKERS, supra
note 7, at 174.
244 Fitts, 49 S.E. at 798.
245 Id. at 795 (writing that neither the federal nor state constitutions "confers any consti-
tutional right to gather crowds and make public orations in the streets of a city regardless of
the municipal control over them"). The Georgia Supreme Court also held that the ordinance
was not facially discriminatory, nor was it applied in an arbitrary manner. Id. at 797-98.
246 Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719 (Kan. 1888).
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conditions of affairs in a city, that street parades should be
confined to certain streets, or should be conducted within
certain hours of the day, or should be forbidden in the night-
time, or that the police department should have some previous
notice, or that there should be other reasonable regulations
respecting them, justified by such a condition that it would be
apparent that regulation, and not prohibition, was the object of
the ordinance.247
Articulating principles that would later animate content-neutral doctrine, the Kansas
court said that regulations must not be "oppressive," but must operate uniformly and
must not allow a government official "to prevent those with whom he [does] not
agree on controverted questions" from publicly communicating.248
As the Court in the 1930s began developing a First Amendment right to use the
streets, it was careful to acknowledge municipal authority to protect public order.
For example, in Lovell, Chief Justice Hughes wrote that the Griffin, Georgia
ordinance was flawed because it was not confined to matters such as the time, place,
or manner of leaflet distribution.24 9 "The ordinance prohibits distribution of litera-
ture of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit from
the City Manager."25 Implicit in Lovell is the notion that municipal power to
protect interests such as "public order" must be balanced against freedom of ex-
pression. As Justice Roberts wrote in Hague, freedom of expression "is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. ' '25 ' It was clear after Lovell, Hague,
Schneider and Cantwell that arbitrary licensing was an abridgment, but could a
system of licensing be permissible if it were limited to content-neutral factors? Was
the heightened scrutiny called for in Schneider appropriate in instances where cities
regulated, but did not prohibit a form of speech? The Court confronted these
questions in Cox v. New Hampshire.
25 2
247 Id. at 723.
248 Id. See also In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72, 76 (Mich. 1886), in which the Michigan
Supreme Court found a parade ordinance invalid because "it suppresse[d] what is in general
perfectly lawful, and because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and
their courses, to an unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regulated at all,
must be by permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."
249 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1937).
250 Id.
251 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); see also Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (stating that courts' task is "to weigh the circumstances and
to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of [free
expression]").
252 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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A. Cox
On the evening of June 8, 1939, eighty-eight Jehovah's Witnesses, divided into
groups of fifteen to twenty members, marched through the business district of
Manchester, New Hampshire without a permit as required by state law.253 Each
small group went to a different part of the business district and walked in single-
file formation on the sidewalks.2"4 Participants carried small signs declaring
"Religion is a Snare and a Racket," and on the reverse side, "Serve God and Christ
the King."'2 5 While marching, the Jehovah's Witnesses also passed out leaflets an-
nouncing a meeting where a talk entitled "Fascism or Freedom" would be
delivered. 6 The participants were instructed to walk on the sidewalks at least
twenty feet apart so "they would be ordinary pedestrians, causing no more inter-
ference with others than any orderly pedestrian. 2 7
Local police, however, claimed the Jehovah's Witnesses walked as close
together as possible and interfered with "normal" sidewalk travel.25 ' There was no
breach of peace or disorderly conduct such as blocking sidewalks, streets, or
crosswalks.25" Nonetheless, five of the Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of
violating the state parade licensing statute.260 The convictions were sustained by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court.26'
Although the statute contained no standards to guide the licensing authority,
the state court - with its eye on cases such as Lovell, Hague, and Schneider -
narrowly construed the statute.2 62 The licensing authority was confined to content-
neutral matters; "if the public convenience is not subjected to undue disturbance,
253 The statute required licenses for theatrical presentations, parades, and open-air public
meetings. Id. at 571. The statute is still in effect. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286:2 (1999).
254 Cox, 312 U.S. at 572.
255 id.
256 id.
257 Appellants' Statement as to Jurisdiction at 22, Cox, 312 U.S. 569 (No. 502).
258 State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508, 511 (N.H. 1940). The Jehovah's Witnesses claimed
unsuccessfully that the statute did not define interference. "The result is that the officers have
uncontrolled discretion in determining whether or not a given joint or common movement
upon the streets of two of more persons falls within the limits" of the law. Appellants' Brief
at 25, Cox, 312 U.S. 569 (No. 502). The state supreme court readily disposed of this
argument: "This was a parade or procession .... It is immaterial that its tactics were few and
simple. It is enough that it proceeded in ordered and close file as a collective body of persons
on the city streets." Cox, 16 A.2d at 511. Chief Justice Hughes accepted the conclusion of
the state court. Cox, 312 U.S. at 575.
259 Cox, 16 A.2d at 511.
260 Cox, 312 U.S. at 570-71.
261 Cox, 16 A.2d at 517.
262 Id. at 515.
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the license must issue. 263 The statute did not authorize censorship because the
discretion "vested in the authority is limited in its exercise by the bounds of reason,
in uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from
improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination.
2 64
As a content-neutral regulation designed to accommodate free expression and
social order, the law promoted "ordered freedom. 2 65 The state court elaborated:
Application for a permit gives the public authorities notice
in advance of any parade or procession for which license may
be granted, thus giving opportunity for its proper policing. And
the license, in fixing the time and place of a parade or proces-
sion, serves to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or
processions, to secure convenient use of the streets by other
travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder. 66
The state supreme court concluded the law had minimal impact on expression,
leaving the display of placards and signs and the distribution of literature
unrestricted.267
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes, the Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed, stating that civil liberties "imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost
263 Id.
264 Id. at 513.
265 Id. at 515.
266 Id. at 514.
267 Id. Despite its claims about the importance of content neutrality, the state court
apparently disliked the message conveyed on signs carried by the marchers. The court wrote,
If short of blasphemy, the motto or slogan that religion is a snare and
a racket was an offence to compelled readers, whose willingness to
read was not consulted. Freedom of speech is not understood to go so
far as to require any hearers to listen, or of writing as to force it to be
read by those confronted with it. The right to worship is not a right to
disturb others in their worship, and the right to free speech and writing
is not one to force speech or writing on an unwilling audience or
readers. It is not unreasonable to say that the sentiment displayed had
a provocative tendency to a disturbance of the peace in view of the
manner, place and time of its publication.
Id. There was, however, no evidence of adverse public reaction to the Jehovah's Witnesses
in Cox. This contrasts with State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (N.H. 1941), affd, 315 U.S. 568
(1942), where Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, angered a crowd by distributing
Jehovah's Witnesses literature; the police intervened and removed Chaplinsky, "apparently
more for his protection than for arrest." Id. at 758. While being escorted by police,
Chaplinsky called one of them "a damned Fascist," leading to his arrest and conviction for
violating the state's "fighting words" statute. Id. at 757, 762.
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in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. 2 68 Because the record in this case displayed
no evidence that the statute had been administered in a discriminatory manner, and
given the state supreme court's limited construction of the statute, Chief Justice
Hughes regarded this case as different than cases such as Hague where licensing was
"an instrument of arbitrary suppression of opinions on public questions., 269
Hughes described the municipal regulation of parades as "traditional, 270 without
acknowledging the origin of parade licensing as a way to limit the speech of dis-
favored religious groups such as the Salvation Army, or the post-Davis manner in
which courts ignored discriminatory licensing decisions. 21 As long as municipal-
ities licensed parades "with regard only to considerations of time, place and manner"
such action was an appropriate method of protecting the public convenience. 272
Cox has a strikingly sterile quality; even Justice McReynolds joined the
opinion. Unlike other cases of that era that are replete with rhetoric about the
value of free expression,273 or the importance of particular modes of expression,274
the dominant theme of Cox is the need for an "organized society. '275 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court essentially dismissed the communicative value of
parades, stating that it believed the Jehovah's Witnesses' leaflets would have had
as large a circulation without the parade, and signs would have been as conspicuous
268 Cox, 312 U.S. at 574.
269 Id. at 577-78. The Court also sustained a fee requirement; the amount of the fee varied
according to the cost of maintaining public order. Id. at 577. As the Court later explained,
such fees cannot be based on content-related factors, such as hostile reactions from audience
members. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1992).
270 Cox, 312 U.S. at 574.
271 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Shaw, 6 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Cal. 1934) (stating that the court
would defer to the judgment of municipal officials that the proposed parade "would be
provocative of disorder and riot," even though permits for parades of similar size had been
granted).
272 Cox, 312 U.S. at 575. As Justice Frankfurter later described the Court's doctrine in this
area, "A licensing standard which gives an official authority to censor the content of a speech
differs toto coelo from one limited by its terms, or by nondiscriminatory practice, to con-
siderations of public safety and the like." Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
273 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) ("Freedom of discussion, if it
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.").
274 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (writing that pamphlets
"have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty").
271 Cox, 312 U.S. at 574. Interestingly, Justice Frankfurter did not include Cox in his
discussion of the preferred position doctrine. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-95
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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if carried by people who were not in marching formation.276 Chief Justice Hughes's
opinion did not question these conclusions.
Recall that Schneider asked courts to "weigh the circumstances," that is, to
balance the state's interest against the impact of the regulation on freedom of
expression."' Chief Justice Hughes accepted, without question, the lower court's
conclusions about licensing as a means of minimizing public disorder.27 8 Yet, other
forms of open-air expression, such as political or religious leafleting, disturb the
"normal" flow of pedestrian traffic; after Lovell, governments were required to
respond to the disruptions created by these modes of speech through measures other
than licensing. If the small groups of Jehovah's Witnesses had distributed leaflets
on the streets of downtown Manchester while standing still, surely no license would
have been required. Why did the combination of movement and literature dis-
tribution justify licensing? 27 9 Chief Justice Hughes was uninterested in this line of
inquiry, referring instead to the generic problems of parades. 80 In short, the judicial
scrutiny called for in Schneider was inappropriate in this type of case.
Nor was Chief Justice Hughes interested in tailoring issues. Cox treats all
"processions," regardless of size, as presenting similar policing problems. 28' This
contrasts with Thornhill v. Alabama,2"2 in which the Court invalidated a ban on
picketing that was not properly tailored to protect public safety. The Thornhill
Court rejected the assumption that a breach of peace was inherent in picketing, no
matter how small the number of participants.2 3 A narrowly drawn statute was
necessary to target "picketing en masse" or behavior by picketers that threatened the
peace. 284 The Court concluded the statute did not specifically aim at serious threats
to public order "and d[id] not evidence any such care in balancing these interests
276 Cox, 16 A.2d at 514.
277 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
278 Cox, 312 U.S. at 575-76.
279 Testimony in Cox indicated that on Saturday evenings, 26,000 people per hour passed
by one of the intersections where one of the groups of Jehovah's Witnesses marched. Cox,
16 A.2d at 511. Given the large number of pedestrians on the sidewalks of downtown
Manchester on Saturday nights, why were only those engaged in expressive activities
required to seek a permit? As Professor Baker commented, "[tihe Jehovah's Witnesses asked
for no special rights. On the contrary, New Hampshire placed special restrictions on them
because they assembled, because they engaged in activity protected by the first amendment.
This law, unanimously upheld by the United States Supreme Court, stands constitutional
commands on their heads." C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory
Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 937, 992
(1983).
280 Cox, 312 U.S. at 576.
281 Id.
282 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
283 Id. at 105.
24 id.
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against the interest of the community and that of the individual in freedom of
discussion on matters of public concern. 285 Of course, the statute at issue in
Thornhill totally banned picketing, whereas the New Hampshire statute was
interpreted as generally requiring the issuance of a license. Read side-by-side,
Thornhill and Cox show that the Hughes Court regarded content-neutral restrictions
that did not seriously restrict a means of communication to be presumptively
constitutional; serious burdens were subjected to a higher level of judicial scrutiny.
Stated differently, as long as states provided access to certain types of public
property on content-neutral terms, the Court would not second-guess local decisions
accommodating competing uses of that property.
The idea that citizens have a right to use public property for expression
differentiates Cox from Davis. But in one aspect Cox resembles Davis; both cases
treat certain forms of open-air speech as threats to public order, regardless of the
number or demeanor of the participants. Additionally, both cases accept licensing
as the method of preserving public order, even though more narrowly tailored
methods are available.
Several important doctrines emanate from Cox that explain the Court's approval
of the parade permit scheme. Implicit in Cox is the idea that parades involve
behavior that can be regulated without regulating "speech." Chief Justice Hughes
accepted the lower court's conclusion that the permit requirement did not interfere
with activities such as the distribution of pamphlets or the display of signs.2"6 In
effect, the law was aimed at the nonmessage aspects of "processions." Shortly after
Cox, the Court began using the term "speech plus" to refer to forms of communi-
cation with collateral consequences apart from the communicative impact of
messages.8 7 The distinction between "pure speech" and "speech plus," however,
is completely arbitrary. As Harry Kalven wrote, "all speech is necessarily 'speech
plus.' If it is oral, it is noise and may interrupt someone else; if it is written, it may
be litter."288
Related to the "speech plus" distinction is the idea that the First Amendment's
protection depends upon the medium. That is, the problems posed by different
media justify distinct modes of regulation. As Justice Jackson wrote in 1949, "The
moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and
285 Id. With the exception of Justice McReynolds, all of the members of the Court voting
to strike down the picketing law in Thornhill also voted to sustain the parade licensing law
in Cox. Justice McReynolds dissented in Thornhill, but joined the Cox opinion.
286 Cox, 312 U.S. at 575.
287 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) (asserting that the solicitation
of funds involves "free speech plus conduct"). For criticism of the "speech plus" distinction,
see William E. Lee, Speaking Without Words: The First Amendment Doctrine of Symbolic
Speech and the Supreme Court, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 495, 514-18 (1991)
[hereinafter Lee, Speaking Without Words].
288 Kalven, supra note 19, at 23.
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the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each,
in my view, is a law unto itself., 28 9 Consequently, permits are permissible with
parades, but impermissible with other forms of expression.290 And, the balancing
employed by the Court in assessing content-neutral regulations is affected by the
Court's perception of the importance of the means of expression.
29
CONCLUSION
Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty.
-Justice Louis Brandeis, 1927292
Justice Brandeis's eloquent rhetoric, written in the context of the clear and
present danger test, presaged decisions by the Hughes Court, such as Stromberg v.
California2 93 and De Jonge v. Oregon,294 limiting the government's power to control
the content of open-air speech. To Justice Brandeis and Chief Justice Hughes,
tolerance of dissent was "a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."295
Cases such as Lovell and Hague, involving discriminatory licensing schemes, are
a continuation of the idea that government officials lack the power to silence their
critics. The right to use public property for open-air speech, first articulated in
Hague and Schneider, was largely based on the role of speech in the democratic
289 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (finding that marching and picketing are entitled to less
First Amendment protection than "pure speech"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 503 (1952) ("Each method [of communication] tends to present its own peculiar
problems.").
29 This set of preferences remains in effect. In 2002, the Court unanimously sustained a
content-neutral permit requirement for large-scale events in public parks. Thomas v. Chi.
Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002). The permit requirement was ministerial, not a system of
censorship, and was acceptable as a means of "safeguarding the good order." Id. at 323
(quoting Cox, 312 U.S. at 574). In the same term, the Court found unconstitutional a
licensing ordinance for door-to-door canvassing and literature distribution. Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). Assuming the licensing to be
"ministerial," the Court held it was nonetheless offensive "to the very notion of a free
society" that a permit was necessary before one could speak in this manner. Id. at 166.
291 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,406 (1989) (The "government generally has
a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken
word.").
292 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
293 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
294 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
29 Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.
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process. The First Amendment cases of the Hughes Court mark a critical turning
point in the history of open-air speech.
The record of the Hughes Court, though, is blemished. Cox assumes that
disorder is inherent in certain forms of open-air speech, an assumption exalting
order at the cost of liberty. In other articles, I have shown the Court's application
of content-neutral methodology to be generally unprotective of poorly-funded
speakers who rely upon low-cost forms of open-air speech.296 The Court has not
been attuned to the discriminatory effects of facially-neutral laws, nor has it been
sensitive to the symbolic or communicative importance of certain modes of open-air
speech. The roots of these insensitivities are found in Cox.
Irrespective of my criticisms of the Court's content-neutral methodology, the
fact that citizens have a First Amendment "easement of assemblage, 297 free of
discretionary licensing, is a significant step away from Davis. The broad principle
that citizens have a right to use streets and parks for open-air speech, subject only
to content-neutral regulation, has endured for more than sixty-five years as one of
the cornerstones of modem First Amendment doctrine.
296 See Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, supra note 9; Lee, Speaking Without Words, supra
note 287; William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado's Chilling Effect on
Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 387 (2002).
297 Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 145 (D.N.J. 1938), affd, 307 U.S.
496 (1939).
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